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INTRODUCTION

In the spring of 2008, Pennsylvania Governor Ed Rendell vowed
to veto a statewide smoking ban if it preempted Philadelphia's
more stringent ordinance.1 Lawyers certainly understood what
preemption of local authority meant. Many non-lawyers arguably
had a basic understanding of the news story as well, realizing that
in some situations state law overrides local authority. The concept of preemption may be generally accessible to both the legal
and lay communities, but behind this accessibility lies a doctrine
that some scholars claim is in a state of confusion. 2
It is within the larger topic of federalism that preemption finds
its home, as a constitutional doctrine that resolves conflicts between the regulatory power of the federal government and the
states' police powers. 3 To say that a federal law preempts state
law is to say that state law on the same topic is foreclosed altogether. Any state law that addresses the same area, even if it
does not conflict with the federal law, is foreclosed. 4 Preemption is
not always intended, however, and in these cases federal and state
laws coexist in a state of concurrency. 5 In these situations, the
Supremacy Clause nevertheless dictates that state law must give
way to federal regulation if it conflicts with federal law. 6 Otherwise, a state is free to regulate in the same area as the federal
government. 7 Importantly, conflict is not relevant to preemption,
but it is central to a supremacy, or conflict, analysis.8 The confu-

1. Tom Barnes, Rendell Says He'll Veto Weakened Ban on Smoking, POST-GAZETTE
Now, May 13, 2008, available at http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/08134/881294-178.stm.
2. David B. Spence & Paula Murray, The Law, Economics, and Politics of Federal
Preemption Jurisprudence: A Quantitative Analysis, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1125, 1153 (1999);
Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 768, 807 (1994).
3. Spence & Murray, supra note 2, at 1127.
4. Gardbaum, supranote 2, at 771.
5. Id.
6. Id. Professor Gardbaum posits that the doctrine originates under the Necessary
and Proper Clause, rather than the Supremacy Clause. Gardbaum, supra note 2, at 773,
782.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 772-73. This article will use the phrases "supremacy analysis" and "conflict
analysis" interchangeably.
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sion found in case law typically arises when courts intermingle or
conflate these distinct concepts. 9
To a significant extent, the same analysis applies to competing
state and local regulation. States are free to enact legislation that
preempts local action, meaning that no local legislation of any
kind is permitted in the target area. 10 However, states may instead contemplate concurrent activity with local governments, in
which case municipalities may regulate freely as long as their ordinances do not conflict with state law." Key to any preemption
and conflict analysis is an understanding of what local powers are
being exercised and what powers, if any, state law usurps. If it is
found that state law is meant to override local authority altogether, preemption exists, and no further analysis is needed. If,
instead, state law contemplates concurrency, the question becomes
one of supremacy, and a court must determine whether the local
ordinance conflicts with the state law by relying on conflict principles. In this regard, nothing is more important to preemption and
1 2
supremacy analyses than statutory interpretation.
In recent decades, a rash of preemption disputes have arisen in
Pennsylvania. Many cases involve local attempts to regulate activity that is otherwise addressed by the Commonwealth's environmental laws. Some of these disputes centered on local police
power regulations that were meant to supplement state environmental regulation, 13 while others involved local zoning legislation. 14 The preemption analysis generally remains the same regardless of whether the type of local legislation is companion environmental or nuisance legislation, or zoning. The outcomes, however, vary. This variance occurs because preemption and supremacy questions ask whether state regulation strips municipalities of
powers that they may otherwise exercise. The Commonwealth's
9. Gaurdbaum, supra note 2, at 768, 807.
10. See, e.g., Duff v. Northampton Twp., 532 A.2d 500, 504 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987)
(noting that Pennsylvania municipalities have limited police power over local matters that
does not extend to activities in need of uniform regulation or matters of "general public
interest which necessarily require an exclusive state policy") (emphasis added), aff'd, 550
A.2d 1919 (Pa. 1988).
11. See, e.g., W. Pa. Rest. Ass'n v. City of Pittsburgh, 77 A.2d 616, 620 (Pa. 1951) (setting forth the basic supremacy analysis, which bans local regulation that is inconsistent
with or contradicts state law).
12. Gardbaum, supra note 2, at 770 ("Preemption claims should be resolved through
application of ordinary rules of statutory interpretation .... ").
13. See, e.g., Sunny Farms, Ltd. v. N. Codorus Twp., 474 A.2d 56 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1984).
14. See, e.g., Greene Twp. v. Kuhl, 379 A.2d 1383 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1977); Kuhl v.
Commonwealth, 467 A.2d 912 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983).
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decision to establish an environmental regulatory program, for
example, may preempt all or part of a locality's environmental
authority but leave untouched any local attempts to address very
similar concerns by way of nuisance or zoning regulation. Therefore, it is legitimate to ask whether the outcome of a preemption or
conflict dispute should hinge on the label affixed to local legislation. The question becomes even more valid when one acknowledges that those labels are becoming frayed at the edges as the
line between environmental protection and land use planning continues to blur. 15 It is imperative that the preemption and supremacy doctrines remain true to their underpinnings to avoid indeterminacy in this age of interest convergence.
This article asks whether Pennsylvania's preemption jurisprudence should be adjusted to enable it to better address the challenges brought upon the Commonwealth and its municipalities by
the growing overlap between environmental and land use concerns. It will focus on preemption cases brought under the Com-

monwealth's Solid Waste Management Act

("SWMIA"),

16

and this

author will ultimately suggest that some revision is in order.
Suggestions include bringing more consistency and clarity to preemption and conflict analyses through careful legislative drafting
and consistent analytical methodology that acknowledge the very
real differences between statewide environmental initiatives and
municipal action intended to preserve and protect local environmental and social values. It is also important to bear in mind environmental law's encouragement of devolution of authority to
17
governmental entities that are closest to the problem at hand.
These suggestions may prevent outcomes that are doctrinally
flawed or inefficient, or that reflect political ideologies that have
8
no place in these decisions.'

15. See, e.g., Lee Paddock, Commentary, Navigating the Confluence Among Real Estate,
Land Use, and Environmental Law, 23 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 677 (2006); Douglas A. Yanggen & Leslie L. Amrhein, GroundwaterQuality Regulation: Existing GovernmentalAuthority and Recommended Roles, 14 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 53 (1989) ("[Zoning has taken on an
environmental focus through the regulation of 'sensitive' lands ... .
16. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6018.101-6018.1003 (2003).
17. William W. Buzbee, Asymmetric Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the
Floor/CeilingDistinction,82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1565-67 (2007).
18. See Spence & Murray, supra note 2, at 1130. Although the discussion here is primarily limited to preemption under one of Pennsylvania's environmental laws, it will nevertheless be of value to practitioners in all jurisdictions, since the preemption doctrine is
fundamentally the same in every state, 3 RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF ZONING & PLANNING §

48:4 (4th ed. 2007-2008), and the intermingling of environmental and land use regulation is
a nationwide trend. See supra text accompanying note 15.
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A necessary starting point for this discussion is a review of the
municipal powers that are typically at issue in these cases. Those
powers include the authority to address nuisances, the more general police powers, and zoning authority. The summary below will
make it clear that each of these three seemingly distinct powers is
broad enough to target certain land use and environmental matters. A discussion of Pennsylvania's most significant preemption
cases will follow, presented in three categories: cases involving
state and local regulation in the same area, cases resolving conflicts between local land use regulations and broad state regulatory programs that include limited land use powers, and cases
where state environmental regulations are pitted against conflicting municipal land use regulations. A review of pertinent portions
of the SWMA and regulations will then be presented, followed by a
discussion of selected preemption and supremacy decisions under
the Act. The final portions of this article will summarize various
themes and concerns that emerge from these authorities and will
elaborate on the suggestions alluded to earlier.
I. LOCAL GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY IN PENNSYLVANIA
The objective here is not to present a comprehensive primer on
local government law in the Commonwealth; rather, it is to highlight the range of powers municipalities may exercise in relation
to solid waste management. In Pennsylvania, those powers depend on the type of municipality involved. Philadelphia, for example, is a city of the first class with home rule authority, empowering it to exercise "all powers ...of local self-government and...
complete powers of legislation and administration in relation to its
municipal functions."'19 The city is as free to enact legislation as is
the General Assembly, as long as its ordinances are consistent
with the federal and Pennsylvania constitutions. 20 Other municipalities in the Commonwealth, which include second and third
class cities, first and second class townships, boroughs, and incorporated towns, are governed by their own enabling acts. 2 1 The
19. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 13131 (2003).
20. § 13131.
21. Pittsburgh is a second-class city governed by the Second Class City Code, 53 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 22101-30915 (2003). It adopted a home rule charter pursuant to its
enabling legislation in 1974. 302 PA. CODE § 11.8-812; see generally § 11.1-101 - 11.8-813.
The Third Class City Code is found at 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 35101-39701 (2003).
First- and second-class townships are also governed by their own codes, found at 53 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 55101-58047 (2003) and 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 65101-70105

(2003), respectively.

The Borough Code appears at 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 45101-
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primary authority for land use for the vast majority of local governments is set forth in the Commonwealth's Municipalities Plan22
ning Code ("MPC").
Local regulations on solid waste management are typically
grounded in the police power, which was originally held exclusively by the Commonwealth to promote the health, safety, and
welfare of its citizens. 23 The General Assembly has since delegated its police power to the Commonwealth's municipalities 24 in
different ways and to varying extents, authorizing them to combat
public nuisances, act in cooperation with the state in relation to
25
solid waste management, and engage in land use planning. It is
hornbook law that Pennsylvania's municipalities possess only
those powers that have been expressly given to them. 26 Enabling
act language thus is crucial, and grants of authority tend to be
narrowly construed.2 7 Although there is a presumption that local
land use ordinances are valid, 28 a municipality must exercise its
29
powers reasonably.
Local authority to address environmental matters and nuisances is clearly established. All municipalities in Pennsylvania
31
have the power to abate nuisances 30 and to ban nuisances per se.
48101 (2003), and incorporated towns are governed by 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5310153862.
22. The MPC is embedded in the state's general municipal law provisions and can be
found at 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 10101- 11202 (2003). Section 10107 of the MPC defines "municipality" to include cities of the second or third class, first- and second-class
townships, boroughs, incorporated towns, home rule municipalities, and counties of the
second through eighth classes. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10107.
23. Pennsylvania's police power has been described as "fundamental because it enables
'civil' society' to respond in an appropriate and effective fashion to changing political, economic, and social circumstances . . . to maintain its vitality and order ....

The police

power of a state . . . [is] as comprehensive as the demands of society require under the
circumstances." National Wood Preservers, Inc. v. Commonwealth Dep't of Envtl. Res., 414
A.2d 37, 42 (Pa. 1980) (citation omitted) (quoting Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co.,
371 A.2d 461, 467 (Pa. 1977)).
24. The term "municipality" and "municipalities" will be used in this paper to refer to
all types of local governments that exist in Pennsylvania.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 30-47.
26. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hanzlik, 161 A.2d 340, 343 (Pa. 1960).
27. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ashenfelder, 198 A.2d 514, 516 (Pa. 1964) (holding that
the Second Class Township Code does not delegate vast powers).
28. Moyer's Landfill, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 450 A.2d 273, 277 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1982).
29. See Ashenfelder, 198 A.2d at 516; Moyer's Landfill, 450 A.2d at 276-77.
30. See 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 14611, 14613 (2003) (First Class Cities); 24562
(2008), 24568 (2003) (Second Class Cities); 37321 (2003), 37324 (2008) (Third Class Cities);
48106 (2003) (Boroughs); 56606 (2003) (First Class Townships); 66529 (2008) (Second Class
Townships).
31. Hanzlik, 161 A.2d at 342-43.
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They are also free to regulate offensive activities that do not create a nuisance, 32 a power they have used to regulate solid waste
activities.3 3 Municipalities are also free to enact local environmental ordinances under their general police powers. 34 More
commonly, local governments choose to enact environmental ordinances when a state environmental statute authorizes them to do
so. The Municipal Waste Planning, Recycling and Waste Reduction Act, for example, specifically authorizes municipalities to
regulate the transportation, collection, and storage of municipal
waste within their boundaries. 35
At times, however, municipalities have sought to regulate solid
waste facilities under neither a nuisance rationale nor an express
delegation of power from the SWVMA. They have instead used their
land use authority. 36 That authority is both broad and specific,
and regardless of the type of municipality involved, the opportunity exists to employ land use powers in ways that further environmental as well as land use policies.
The land use powers of Pennsylvania's cities of the first and second class (Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, respectively) are virtually
identical and appear in their respective enabling acts. The cities
may zone to promote the police powers 37 and are free to restrict
land uses, the size and height of buildings, and the amount of land
that can be occupied by structures. 38 These broad powers exist to
enable the Commonwealth's largest cities to respond to their
unique geography and character. 39 Furthermore, the codes gov-

32. Id.; Hunlock Twp. v. Hunlock Sand & Gravel Corp., 601 A.2d 1305, 1307 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1992). Although these powers authorize a municipality to enact a nuisance
ordinance that restricts land use to a limited extent, there may be a fine line between the
exercise of this power and unauthorized attempts at zoning. Id. at 1307 (holding that a
setback requirement in a nuisance ordinance regulating solid waste facilities, enacted by a
township without a zoning ordinance, was not an illegal attempt to zone, stating, "[sletback
requirements may be imposed by other types of regulations in addition to zoning").
33. One township without a zoning ordinance, for example, successfully used its nuisance authority to impose a stringent setback requirement on a sludge composting facility.
Hunlock Twp., 601 A.2d at 1305-06.
34. See Longenecker v. Pine Grove Landfill, Inc., 543 A.2d 215, 216 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1988) (making note of the township's general police powers but holding that the ordinance
at issue was not a police power regulation but rather an illegal attempt to zone).
35. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4000.304 (2003).
36. See, e.g., Se. Chester County Refuse Auth. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 898 A.2d 680 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2006) [hereinafter SECCRA], appeal denied, 921 A.2d 499 (Pa. 2007).
37. See 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 14751 (2008) (first class city powers); 53 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 25051 (2008) (second class city powers).
38. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 14751-14752; 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 25051.
39. See 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 25053 (2008) (directing second class cities to exercise
their zoning powers by considering "the topography and character of the district, with its
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erning first and second class cities each include a conflict-of-laws
provision, which states that city standards will govern in the
event a city land use ordinance imposes stricter requirements
40
than those imposed by a state statute.
All other municipalities in Pennsylvania are governed by the
MPC, 41 the objectives of which are expansive. 42 The aim of the
MPC is not simply to authorize municipalities to determine land
uses, sizes and heights of buildings, open space dimensions, and
other matters relevant to the general welfare, 43 but also to consider a municipality's "character" and "special nature" by zoning
to preserve natural, agricultural, and historic amenities. 44 Although a municipality's zoning restrictions generally must be uniform across all of its districts, special classifications are permitted
for "places having a special character or use affecting and affected
by their surroundings." 45 The purposes of zoning are as much directed at fighting blight, overcrowding, and traffic congestion as
they are at protecting various environmental amenities, including
46
wetlands, forests, and floodplains.
The land use authority for all of Pennsylvania's municipalities
includes the use of zoning to address their unique character and
topography as well as local environmental concerns. The MPC
goes even further by embracing a broader conception of land use
that references the economic and social parameters of sustainable
development. 47 While the scope of the zoning power under the
MPC is remarkable, the crucial point for the purposes of this discussion is that the Code unquestionably reflects an understanding
that zoning exists, in large part, to enable municipalities to deal
with unique local features and environmental conditions.
peculiar suitability for particular uses, and with a view to conserving [property values] and
encouraging the most appropriate use of land throughout such city").
40. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 14762, 25058 (2008). Both of these statutes also provide
that a state statute will prevail if stricter than the city ordinance. Id.
41. The MPC's definition of "municipality" includes all local governmental entities
except first and second class cities. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10107 (2008) (including
second class A and third class cities, boroughs, incorporated towns, and all classes of township, among other entities).
42. Section 10105 of the MPC includes the usual goals of promoting health, safety, and
morals. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 10105 (2008).
43. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10603(a) (2008).
44. Id. at (a)-(b) (noting that these powers exist unless preempted by a list of specific
environmental laws, not including the SWMA).
45.

53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10605(l)-(2).

46. See, e.g., §§ 10105, 10605. Section 10105 further links the general welfare prong of
the police powers to "economic, practical, and social and cultural facilities .... ".
47. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10105 (including the protection and promotion of economic, social, and cultural facilities and growth among the purposes of land use planning).
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A number of well-settled legal principles and rules of construction are ubiquitous in zoning cases. A zoning ordinance's validity
depends on compliance with the procedural requirements of the
MPC. 48 Furthermore, a zoning ordinance will be found substantively invalid if it is arbitrary, unnecessary, or unreasonable, or if
it is enacted solely to restrict future development, even if it is intended to promote the police powers. 49 Finally, although courts
construe a municipality's zoning power liberally, they will interpret zoning ordinances narrowly because they are in derogation of
50
the common law.
Pennsylvania's municipal land use powers are heavily codified
and well developed by case law. These powers are often the subject of preemption cases, where their strength and distinctiveness
can play a pivotal role in resolving competing state and local authority.

II. PENNSYLVANIA'S PREEMPTION AND SUPREMACY LAW
The following cases are representative of Pennsylvania's preemption case law. 51 Some of these cases do not deal with conflicts
between state environmental laws and local land use ordinances;
nevertheless, they are cited in preemption cases of all kinds. Together, they affirm the importance of a multi-step analysis in
these disputes and reveal a degree of confusion about the distinction between preemption and conflict.
To recap, in cases of state preemption, a locality has no power to
regulate in the area; in the case of concurrency, however, a locality
may regulate as long as its regulation is consistent with state
law. 52 It is notable that Pennsylvania has found total preemption
in only three areas: liquor control, 53 anthracite strip mining, 54 and

48. Longenecker, 543 A.2d at 216-17 (invalidating a local ordinance mandating landfill
setbacks due to noncompliance with the MPC).
49. Exton Quarries, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 228 A.2d 169, 178 (Pa. 1967)
(holding a local ban on quarries unconstitutional).
50. Exton Quarries, 228 A.2d at 173-74. This rule is echoed in the MPC, which provides that, in case of doubt about the meaning of a zoning ordinance, it should be interpreted in a property owner's favor. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10603.1 (2003).
51. Throughout this article, the phrases "preemption case law" and "preemption cases"
will be used to refer to cases dealing with preemption as well as those dealing with conflict
under supremacy principles.
52. See supra text accompanying notes 4-7; see also 3 RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF ZONING
AND PLANNING § 48:4 (4th ed. 2007-2008).
53. Petition of Hilovsky, 108 A.2d 705 (Pa. 1954).
54. Harris-Walsh, Inc. v. Borough of Dickson City, 216 A.2d 329 (Pa. 1966).
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banking. 55 The meager number of cases in which total preemption
has been found underscores the harshness of the doctrine and the
56
rarity of its existence.
These core cases might be presented based on the type of preemption involved: express preemption, where statutory language
clearly states local action is forbidden; 57 field preemption, where
the legislature intends for the state to occupy the field; 58 or con-

59
flict/supremacy cases, where local law conflicts with state law.
This article will instead categorize these cases by distinguishing
between those that deal with state and local laws that attempt to
regulate in the same area, those where state and local agencies
with overlapping yet distinct land use powers attempt to regulate
the same activity, and those where state regulation in an area unrelated to land use conflicts with a local land use regulation. In
this latter category, the disputes often involve state environmental regulations that conflict with local land use ordihances.60
These categories will be referred to as "companion regulation
cases," "overlapping land use authority cases," and "environmental-land use disputes," respectively.

55. City of Pittsburgh v. Allegheny Valley Bank, 412 A.2d 1366 (Pa. 1980) (superceded
by statute as recognized in City of Phila. v. Clement & Muller, Inc., 715 A.2d 397 (Pa.
1998)).
56. See Hydropress Envtl. Serv., Inc. v. Twp. of Upper Mt. Bethel, 836 A.2d 912, 918
(Pa. 2003) (plurality opinion) (referring to the harshness of the preemption doctrine).
57. Spence & Murray, supra note 2, at 1134.
58. Id.
59. Id. For example, in the three cases referred to above where preemption was found
to exist, the courts were convinced of the General Assembly's intent to occupy the field.
Hilovsky, 108 A.2d at 707; Harris-Walsh,216 A.2d at 336; Allegheny Valley Bank, 412 A.2d
at 1369. Some courts have characterized Allegheny Valley Bank as one that found preemption based on commercial necessity. See, e.g., Council of Middletown Twp. v. Benham, 523
A.2d 311, 314 (Pa. 1987). However, a review of the case makes clear that it, too, was based
on field preemption. See Allegheny Valley Bank, 412 A.2d at 1369.
60. See, e.g., Miller & Son Paving, Inc. v. Wrightstown Twp., 451 A.2d 1002 (Pa. 1982)
(Court called upon to determine whether the Surface Mining Conservation and Reclamation Act setback provisions preempted those in a local zoning ordinance).
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Category Name
Companion Regulation Cases

Overlapping Land Use
Authority Cases
Environmental-Land Use
Disputes

Traits
State and Local Governments
Use Similar Regulatory
Powers to Regulate Same Area
State and Local Governments
Use Overlapping Land Use
Powers to Regulate Same Area
Local Government Uses
Land Use Power in Possible
Contradiction to Unrelated
State Environmental
Regulatory Scheme

Of these three types of cases, the environmental-land use dispute is unique in that the Commonwealth's and municipality's
respective powers do not overtly overlap (or at least have not been
traditionally understood to coincide with one another). Furthermore, when overlap does occur, it is not as patent or as broad as in
other types of preemption disputes, and the overlap arguably is
not as threatening to statewide regulation as might be the case in
a companion regulation case or in an overlapping land use authority case. In this third category, the powers being exercised by the
state and local government promote two different things: environmental protection and responsible land use planning, respectively. Absent express or field preemption, these cases should easily be resolved under a supremacy analysis. Logic suggests that,
because environmental regulation and land use regulation serve
different objectives, no conflict would exist, leaving local regulation intact. Although this observation is generally accurate, the
cases are not consistently analyzed in this manner. The preemption analysis at times fails to distinguish between the general objectives of land use and environmental regulation and instead focuses narrowly on the specific provisions of competing state and
local laws.
A.

Companion Regulation Cases

The seminal case of Western Pennsylvania Restaurant Association v. City of Pittsburgh6' involved a dispute over allegedly con61.

77 A.2d 616 (Pa. 1951).
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flicting provisions of a state law and a Pittsburgh ordinance, both
of which regulated restaurants. 62 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court found no preemption, partially because the state law expressly authorized consistent, supplemental local legislation. 63 In
64
upholding portions of the city ordinance and invalidating others,
the Court recited rules of preemption and conflict in language that
has been quoted in numerous subsequent decisions:
It is of course self-evident that a municipal ordinance cannot be
sustained to the extent that it is contradictory to, or inconsistent
with, a state statute. But, generally speaking "it has long been
the established general rule, in determining whether a conflict
exists between a general and local law, that where the legislature
has assumed to regulate a given course of conduct by prohibitory
enactments, a municipal corporation with subordinate power to
act in the matter may make such additional regulations in aid and
furtherance of the purpose of the general law as may seem appropriate to the necessities of the particular locality and which are
not in themselves unreasonable." National Milk Producers Association v. City & County of San Francisco,20 Cal.2d 101, 109, 124
P.2d 25, 29. Thus it has been held in our own Commonwealth
that municipalities in the exercise of the police power may regulate certain occupations by imposing restrictions which are in addition to, and not in conflict with, statutory regulations. But if the
general tenor of the statute indicates an intention on the part of
the legislature that it should not be supplemented by municipal
bodies, that intention must be given effect and the attempted local
65
legislation held invalid.
This language can be analyzed in reference to the preemption/supremacy distinction. The Court does not address preemption first. Instead, it begins by stating the basic supremacy rule:
a municipal ordinance cannot be "contradictory to, or inconsistent
with, a state statute." 66 The Court then provides a rule to help
resolve conflicts between state and local legislation in the same
area: municipalities may enact companion or supplemental regulations "in aid and furtherance of' a state statute "as may seem
appropriate to the necessities of the particular locality and which

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

W. Pa. Rest. Ass'n, 77 A.2d 616.
Id. at 620.
Id. at 621.
Id. at 620 (citations omitted).
Id.
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are not in themselves unreasonable." 67 Only then does the Court
mention the possibility of total preemption, noting that if the
"general tenor" of a state law reveals an intent "that it should not
be supplemented by municipal bodies," then local legislation is
prohibited. 68 This final statement reflects the field preemption
doctrine, under which a locality would not be free to legislate at
all. The Court's distinction between total preemption and concurrency is both correct and important.
The language could have been more clear. The Court never
mentioned preemption by express statutory language, most likely
because the state law did not expressly preempt local law. The
Court might also have clarified that the supremacy rule applies
when there is no express or field preemption. Nevertheless, its
analysis reflects a basic analytical progression, first rejecting preemption and then turning to supremacy and conflict. 69 In addition
to providing a rule generally fixing the reach of local regulation in
the case of concurrency, the Court emphasized the importance of
70
statutory language in any preemption case.
To the extent that any ambiguity remained after Western Pennsylvania RestaurantAssociation, it was resolved forty-eight years
later in Mars Emergency Medical Services, Inc. v. Township of Adams.71 That case resolved a conflict between Pennsylvania's
Emergency Medical Services ("EMS") Act and two local ordinances
designating local EMS providers. 72 The Court cited the rules from
Western Pennsylvania RestaurantAssociation and emphasized the
rarity of preemption. 73 Unlike the statute at issue in Western
Pennsylvania RestaurantAssociation, however, the EMS Act was
silent as to local authority to legislate in the area. 74 Accordingly,
the Court scrutinized the statutory language for restrictions on
local legislation. 75 Finding none, it proceeded to consider whether
the municipalities involved-a second class township and a borough-had the authority to designate EMS providers. 76 After reviewing the relevant enabling legislation, the Court concluded

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

W. Pa. Rest. Ass'n, 77 A.2d at 620 (citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 620-21.
Id. at 619-20.
740 A.2d 193 (Pa. 1999).
Mars, 740 A.2d at 193.
Id. at 195-96 (noting the three instances where total preemption exists).
Id. at 196.
Id.

Id.
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that both municipalities acted within their authority.7 7 The case
was thus reduced to a supremacy issue and, in determining
whether the local ordinances were consistent with the state law,
the Court stated that it was necessary to consider "whether the
[local ordinances] advanced or thwarted the purposes of the act." 78
The case was remanded for the trial court to make that determi79
nation.
Mars is notable for the progression of its analysis. The Court
dealt with possible preemption first and, finding no express or implied preemption, proceeded to the issue of municipal authority.
Having determined that the necessary authority existed, it then
addressed the supremacy issue. The opinion also elaborated on
considerations that are relevant to a conflict or consistency analysis, directing the lower court to determine whether the local ordinances further the purposes of the state law. Thus, a local law,
even if enacted with authority, will be held to be inconsistent with
a state law-and therefore overridden-if it thwarts the state
law's objectives. Mars not only filled the gap left by Western
Pennsylvania Restaurant Association by inquiring into both express and implied preemption, but it elaborated on relevant supremacy considerations.
In 2003, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had the opportunity
to hear a companion regulation case involving a state environmental statute. In Hydropress Environmental Services, Inc. v.
Township of Upper Mt. Bethel, the Court considered whether a
local ordinance regulating the application of biosolids to agricultural lands was preempted by the SWMA.8 0 This case will be described more fully below, but a few points should be mentioned
here. Although Hydropress was a plurality decision on the matter
of preemption,8 1 it reaffirmed the doctrine set forth in Western
Pennsylvania Restaurant Association.8 2 The justices in Hydropress who believed the SWMIA did not preempt local legislation
stated that, because of the harshness of preemption, the intent to

77. Mars, 740 A.2d at 196.
78. Id. at 196-97 (noting that the objectives of the EMS Act included the provision of
"effective and efficient emergency medical services on a uniform basis throughout the
Commonwealth").
79. Id. at 197.
80. 836 A.2d 912 (Pa. 2003) (plurality opinion).
81. Hydropress, 836 A.2d at 920. Three justices found that the SWMA did not preempt
local legislation; three others disagreed. Id. at 918-19.
82. Id. at 918.
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preempt must be clearly expressed or otherwise certain.8 3 They
relied heavily on statutory language contemplating state and local
cooperation and power sharing in the area of solid waste management. 84 Their rationale echoed a factor that was also relevant
in Western Pennsylvania Restaurant Association: in cases where
there is no express preemption, courts will be less likely to find
implied preemption if the state legislation creates a partnership
between state and local authorities in the regulated area.
A final companion regulation case is Duff v. Northampton
Township,8 5 which preceded both Mars and Hydropress. The
Commonwealth Court was called upon to determine whether a
local firearms ordinance conflicted with a Pennsylvania statute
that restricted hunting with firearms within a certain distance of
a dwelling.8 6 The court addressed whether the ordinance was preempted by the game law, or in the alternative, whether it was
unlawful as an unreasonable exercise of the municipality's police
powers.8 7 In doing so, and in ultimately invalidating the ordinance,88 the court unfortunately intermingled the preemption and
supremacy concepts, thereby creating an unclear decisional
framework that has reappeared in subsequent decisions.
Several times throughout the opinion, Senior Judge Narick interchangeably referred to preemption and supremacy without
clearly delineating the two. The court claimed that the ordinance
conflicted with the state law, yet at the same time maintained
that the game law reflected a need for uniform statewide regulation.8 9 However, as noted earlier, a conflict requires a supremacy
analysis, whereas an intent to create a statewide regulatory program invokes field preemption. If preemption is found, local legislation is forbidden, even if it does not conflict with the state
scheme; therefore, a supremacy analysis is irrelevant. Later in
Duff, the court correctly noted that express or implied preemption
strips a municipality of its power to regulate 90 but then immedi83. Id.
84. Id.
85. 532 A.2d 500 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987), affd, 550 A.2d 1319 (Pa. 1988).
86. Duff, 532 A.2d at 500-02. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court looked at a similar
case earlier, but avoided the preemption issue. See Ashenfelder, 198 A.2d at 514. The
ordinance in Duff was both broader and more restrictive than the state law. One provision,
not found in the state law, required hunters to get approval from the police chief before
hunting in township safety zones. Duff, 532 A.2d at 502.
87. Duff, 532 A.2d at 501.
88. Id. at 505-06.
89. Id. at 503.
90. Id. at 503-04.
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ately cited the portion of Western Pennsylvania Restaurant Association that addressed conflict in cases of concurrent regulation. 91
The court then promptly reverted to the preemption rule, stating
that "a municipality may be foreclosed from exercising power it
would otherwise have if the state has sufficiently acted in a par92
ticular field."
The back-and-forth references to preemption and conflict culminated in a presentation of five questions that the court stated were
pertinent in finding preemption:
(1) Does the ordinance conflict with the state law, either because of conflicting policies or operational effect, that is, does
the ordinance forbid what the legislature has permitted? (2)
Was the state law intended expressly or impliedly to be exclusive in the field? (3) Does the subject matter reflect a need for
uniformity? (4) Is the state scheme so pervasive or comprehensive that it precludes coexistence of municipal regulation?
(5) Does the ordinance stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
93
the legislature?
Like other portions of the opinion, these questions mingled factors relevant to both preemption and supremacy without setting
them within an analytical progression. Questions 2, 3, and 4 address field preemption, while questions 1 and 5 concern supremacy and conflict in cases of concurrency. Unfortunately, the court
never made that distinction and presented all five questions as
relevant to "preemption" alone. Duff is not unique. It reflects a
lack of clarity common in preemption case law. 94 Ironically, because the court eventually held that the state's game law preempted the field of firearm regulation, 95 supremacy was not an
issue, and two of the five questions need not have been presented.
To be sure, Duff correctly stresses the importance of statutory
construction, 96 and it is helpful in noting that no presumption of
preemption arises merely because the General Assembly passes a

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 504.
Duff, 532 A.2d at 504.
Id. at 505.
See supra text accompanying note 2.
Duff, 532 A.2d at 506.
Id. at 504.
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law. 97 Nevertheless, the case's five questions are an unfortunate
legacy that has tainted later decisions.
B.

OverlappingLand Use Authority Cases

A second series of cases deals with conflicts between local land
use ordinances and state land use powers that are embedded
within larger regulatory programs. Because these cases are ones
of limited overlap in land use authority, they could properly be
labeled companion regulation cases. Indeed, the basic preemption
analysis remains the same. However, these cases are treated
separately because of the special deference given to municipal
land use authority. As will soon be shown, local land use powers
are treated specially when compared to the police powers exercised in the companion dispute cases addressed above.
School District of Philadelphia v. Zoning Board of Adjustment
illustrates this deferential treatment. 98 In the 1960's, the Philadelphia School District, which operated under the Public School
Code, proposed a plan for a new school building and parking lot
that would violate the height and rear-yard limits of the city's zoning ordinance as well as off-street parking restrictions. 99 When
the school district was denied a building permit, it sued unsuccessfully, despite its argument that it was "exempt" from the city's
zoning ordinance. 10 0 The district relied in part, on statutory language that obligated it to provide schools and grounds as needed
to administer a statewide program of public education and which
gave it discretionary authority over both the location and size of
schools. 101
In School District of Philadelphia,much of the Court's preemption and conflict analysis was familiar. The sequence of analytical
steps, however, differed, and special attention was given to the
city's land use authority. Rather than beginning with a discussion
of preemption and supremacy rules, the Court addressed the scope
of the city's zoning powers.10 2 It explained that Philadelphia had
extensive powers of self-government, virtually enabling it to legis-

97. Id. at 503.
98. 207 A.2d 864 (Pa. 1965).
99. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 207 A.2d at 865-66. The case was ultimately brought as a challenge solely against the off-street parking provisions. Id. at 866.

100.

Id.

101.
102.

Id. at 868.
Id. at 867.
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late as would the General Assembly. 10 3 Nevertheless, the city
could not act in a manner "contrary to, or in limitation or
enlargement of, powers granted by acts of the General Assembly"
that related to the regulation of public schools. 10 4 The Court determined that the zoning restrictions at issue did not deal with the
regulation of public schools, which focuses on the quality of public
education rather than the buildings in which that education is

provided. 105
In essence, by carefully considering the objectives of zoning and
finding those objectives different from the aims of the Public
School Code, the Court rejected the district's supremacy argument. The Court characterized zoning as "peculiarly a local mat10 6
ter," while the Code dealt with matters of "state-wide concern."
Not only did the Court find no conflict because the off-street parking restrictions did not interfere with the Public School Code, but
it also held that the Code did not give the school district "plenary
power over its physical plants. ' 10 7 Thus, the Court found no preemption of local land use authority and no conflict, based on the
nature of the powers at play.10 8 Philadelphia was free to impose
more stringent restrictions on schools to address "congestion and
other peculiarly local problems [.]"109
A similar case arose on the other side of the Commonwealth a
few years later. In City of Pittsburgh v. Commonwealth, the
Pennsylvania Bureau of Corrections sought to lease city land for a
women's prison pre-release center without seeking zoning ap-

103.

Sch. Dist. of Phila., 207 A.2d at 867 (referring to the First Class City Home Rule

Act).
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
Public

Id. (citing then 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 13101 (2008)).
Id.
Id. at 868.
Id. at 868-70.
Sch. Dist. of Phila., 207 A.2d at 868. The Court so held despite the language in the
School Code that arguably gave the District authority over the location of schools.

Id.
109. Id. at 870. The Court also relied on the conflict-of-laws provision in the First Class
City Home Rule Act, and other state laws dealing with municipal buildings, including
schools, that specifically call for the acquisition of municipal building permits when required by local ordinance. Id. at 869. Four years later, the Court addressed head on
whether a first-class township, acting under the authority of its zoning ordinance, could
restrict the location of schools. Appeal of Radnor Twp. Sch. Auth., 252 A.2d 597 (Pa. 1969).
The case was treated as a conflict between two state statutes; thus, it was not cast as a
preemption case. Instead, the Court resorted to the state's Statutory Construction Act to
determine whether the statutes could coexist, and ultimately held that the Public School
Code prevented the township from exercising its zoning power. Radnor Twp., 252 A.2d. at
600.
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proval. 110 The Bureau relied on the land use powers included in
its expansive enabling legislation that gave it the power to establish the location of pre-release centers throughout the state as it
felt they were needed."1 The Court found no legislative grant of
site selection powers to the Bureau, nor any other language implying that the Bureau was not bound by local zoning powers.11 2 The
case was thus one of conflict, and the Court ultimately held that
the Bureau was not "immune" from Pittsburgh's zoning ordi11 3
nance.
The conflict analysis in City of Pittsburghincluded a number of
new observations. Because the Bureau and the city were both
state entities with legislative power, the Court considered them
equal agents exercising state-given powers.1 1 4 As such, the state
agency would not automatically prevail over the city.1 15 The Court
noted that, although the two entities could exercise only those
powers given to them by the General Assembly, local zoning powers are often more comprehensive than those given to state agencies.11 6 More importantly, the Court acknowledged the need to
examine legislative intent in resolving the conflict between the
Bureau's and the city's land use authority, crafting a balancing
test that looked to the nature and purpose of each entity's legislative grant of power and the circumstances of the case.11 7 In ruling
for the city, the Court focused on the city's powers to engage in
comprehensive planning, the conflict-of-laws provision in the Second Class City Code, and the fact that the Bureau was not given
the power of eminent domain.1 18
Less than ten years later, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court partially overruled City of Pittsburghin Commonwealth Department
of General Services v. Ogontz Area Neighbors Association.119
Ogontz was another overlapping land use authority dispute in
which a state agency was denied a local land use permit-this
110. City of Pittsburgh v. Commonwealth, 360 A.2d 607, 609 (Pa. 1976), overruled by,
Commw. Dep't of Gen. Serv. v. Ogontz Area Neighbors Ass'n, 483 A.2d 448 (Pa. 1984), and
superseded by statute, Act of July 13, 1987, 1987 Pa. Legis. Serv. 102, as stated in, Delaware County Solid Waste Auth. v. Earl Twp., 535 A.2d 225 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987).
111. City of Pittsburgh,360 A.2d at 612.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 609, 614.
114. Id. at 610.
115. Id.
116. City of Pittsburgh,360 A.2d at 611.
117. Id. at 611-12.
118. Id. at 613.
119. 483 A.2d 448 (Pa. 1984).
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time, for a daycare center for mentally handicapped individuals in
Philadelphia. 120 As in School District of Philadelphia,the Court
first examined the city's powers, focusing on Philadelphia's home
rule authority and the conflict-of-laws provision. 12 1 By statute, the
Department of Public Welfare could use eminent domain to further its program to integrate patients from a hospital and school
into the community. 122 The Court recognized the case as one of
conflict between a state agency's land use powers and a municipality's zoning ordinance, echoing City of Pittsburgh's characterization of the case as one involving two equally positioned governmental authorities. 123
After emphasizing the equal footing of the Department and the
city, the Court engaged in statutory interpretation to determine
whether either entity had "preeminent powers. 1 24 Underscoring
that the "common thread" in this type of case is the need to ascertain legislative intent, 125 the Court rejected City of Pittsburgh's
balancing test as both uncertain and irrelevant to legislative intent. 26 The Court then turned to Pennsylvania's Statutory Construction Act, particularly that section which directs courts to consider "the consequences of a particular interpretation" when addressing conflicting state laws. 127 The Court rationalized that the
city's zoning policies would be frustrated if the Department prevailed; if the city prevailed, however, the Department would
merely need to find another location. 28 A decision in the city's

120. Ogontz, 483 A.2d at 449-50.
121. Id. at 451-52. Again, the conflict of laws provision provides that, in cases where
Philadelphia's zoning ordinance is more stringent than those of any other state or local
ordinance, the city's more stringent provisions will prevail. Id. at 451.
122. Id. at 452.
123. Id.
124. Id. The conflict-of-laws provision applicable to cities of the first class did not resolve the dispute, because it does not apply to land use restrictions. Id. at 452-53 (noting
the provision instead applies to "setback, height, and similar restrictions").
125. Ogontz, 483 A.2d at 453-54.
126. Id. at 454. The City of Pittsburgh balancing test had been expanded to include six
factors relevant to a conflict analysis. Id. at 452-53. The Court noted that Twp. of South
Fayette v. Commonwealth, 385 A.2d 344, 347 (Pa. 1978), included these factors in the conflict balancing test: whether the intended use violates the zoning ordinance; the significance of the state's ownership in the property; "the parens patriae responsibility of the
Commonwealth;" the authority in the statute to establish state agency facilities; the absence of a conflict of laws provision in the enabling legislation; and the particular circumstances of the case. Id. at 453. The Court was particularly skeptical of the factor focusing
on eminent domain power. Id. at 454.
127. Id. at 455 (citing 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1921(c)(6) (2003)).
128. Id.

Winter 2009

Principled Preemption

favor would uphold both statutes, which the Court wrote, "seems
129
advisable."
Immediately after it held that the Department was subject to
the local zoning ordinance, the Court stated, "We decline to infer a
legislative intent that the Commonwealth agency has preemptive
land use powers.' 130 This reference to preemption is unfortunate.
Ogontz is a case of supremacy and conflict, not preemption. The
Court should have-after addressing the powers of the respective
parties- briefly established that the Department's enabling legislation neither expressly nor impliedly preempted local land use
authority. That conclusion would have placed the conflict analysis
where it belongs-after a determination that preemption does not
exist.
The uncertainty surrounding preemption and conflict in these
three cases should not overshadow their contributions to this discussion. Unlike the companion regulation cases, the overlapping
land use cases deal with similar powers being exercised by state
and municipal authorities in different contexts. State agencies
with broad programmatic authority that are given some degree of
land use authority must exercise that authority in furtherance of
the overall objectives of their programs. This restriction applied
to the agencies involved in the cases noted previously. In a conflict analysis, the exercise of the state agency's land use power will
likely succumb to local land use authority, assuming that there is
no preemption of local land use authority. The outcome is dependent on the type of municipality involved, but municipalities
generally prevail either because 1) the agency's authority is tied to
state policies that are distinct from those underlying land use
power (as in School District of Philadelphia)or 2) state law does
not precisely give an agency site selection or other land use powers
(as in City of Pittsburgh). The comprehensiveness of local zoning
power and the recognition that municipal land use powers serve
peculiarly local concerns are prominent factors in these cases.
Interestingly, in both School District of Philadelphiaand Ogontz,
the Court addressed local powers before proceeding to the preemption and conflict discussion.

129.
130.

Id.
Ogontz, 483 A.2d at 455.
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Environmental-Land Use Disputes

A third type of preemption case involves conflicts between
Pennsylvania's environmental laws and local land use ordinances.
Absent express or implied preemption, and based on cases such as
City of Pittsburgh, there would seem to be few supremacy successes for the state because the power it exercises under these
laws is distinguishable from municipal zoning power.
Even
though local land use authority touches on environmental concerns, it does so only as to local conditions. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court had the opportunity to make that distinction in two
cases but failed to do so.
In Miller & Son Paving, Inc. v. Wrightstown Township,1' 1 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court avoided a conflict analysis altogether. Instead, it focused on whether regulations under the Surface Mining Conservation and Reclamation Act ("SMCRA"), which
established setbacks for quarries, 132 preempted preexisting local
zoning setbacks, and if not, whether the local setbacks were arbitrary and capricious and hence unreasonable. 33 The relevant portion of SMCRA expressly provided, "[e]xcept with respect to Zoning Ordinances, all local ordinances and enactments purporting to
regulate surface mining are hereby superseded. The Commonwealth by this enactment hereby preempts the regulation of surface mining operations as herein defined."' 134 Reasoning that "superseded" meant replacing something that is already in existence,
the Court held that the local setbacks, although preexisting, were
not affected because of the zoning ordinance exception in the first
clause of the statutory provision. 135 Moreover, "preempt" refers to
the preclusion of something that would otherwise come into effect
in the future, and again, because the local setbacks predated
SMCRA, they were not preempted under the provision's second
clause.136
Having dispensed with preemption, the Court turned to the reasonableness of the township's zoning ordinance. 37 It determined
131. 451 A.2d 1002 (Pa. 1982).
132. Miller & Son Paving, 451 A.2d at 1004 (referencing 52 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
1396.4b (2008) and 25 PA. CODE § 77.102(f)(6) (1998)).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1005 (citing section 17 of SMCRA).
135. Id. The Court also relied on provisions of the state's Statutory Construction Act
that call for interpretation of statutes by relying on the common usage of terms and giving
effect to all of a statute's provisions. Id.
136. Id. at 1005.
137. Miller & Son Paving,451 A.2d at 1006.
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that the Commonwealth did not meet its burden of proving that
the zoning ordinance failed to promote the public health, safety, or
welfare, 3 8 and thus never addressed whether the ordinance conflicted with the SMCRA setback. 139 Miller Paving is nevertheless
important for distinguishing between statutory supersession and
preemption. The case suggests that, when choosing to override
local authority, the General Assembly should take care to include
both terms-"supersede" and "preempt"-where it intends to
usurp future legislative activity by municipalities as well as legislation that antedates state law.
In Council of Middletown Township v. Benham,140 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court dealt with a similar issue, this time suggesting that a state environmental regulation may override a local
zoning ordinance in certain instances. The case involved a conflict
between Pennsylvania's Sewage Facilities Act and a township zoning ordinance that required residential developments to be serviced by "public sanitary sewer systems."'14 A developer who had
no access to a public system submitted a planned residential development application to the township that included private sewage treatment. 42 Relying on the public service mandate of the
ordinance, the township denied the application. 143 The Court held
that the Sewage Facilities Act did not preempt local legislation,
primarily because the Act made municipal legislation "an essential component of the statewide regulatory scheme."' 44 The Act
did, however, expressly provide that any local regulations enacted
in furtherance of local permitting, inspection, and enforcement
authority had to be consistent with the Act and the rules promul45
gated thereunder.
138. Id.
139. Id. It is likely the DEP did not raise this issue. If so, one can only wonder why the
DEP failed to make the argument. Had the DEP been able to demonstrate a conflict between the state and local setbacks, the state law and regulations would prevail. Perhaps
the DEP saw no inherent conflict between environmental regulation and land use regulation.

140. 523 A.2d 311 (Pa. 1987).
141. Benham, 523 A.2d at 311-12.
142. Id. at 312-13. Municipal service would not be extended to the area for at least 20
years. Id. at 313.
143. Id. at 313.
144. Id. at 314. The Court also took the time to carefully review the three cases in which
total preemption was found: Hilovsky, 108 A.2d 705 (Pa. 1954) (liquor), Harris-Walsh,216
A.2d 329 (Pa. 1966) (anthracite strip mining), and Allegheny Valley Bank, 412 A.2d 1366
(Pa. 1980) (banking). The point was to demonstrate that "[tiotal preemption is the exception and not the rule." Benham, 523 A.2d at 314-15.
145. Benham, 523 A.2d at 313-14 (citing 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 750.8 (2003)).
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Because the Sewage Facilities Act did not expressly preempt local land use authority, and because the Act's power-sharing provisions militated against a finding of implied preemption, the Court
was left to address the supremacy issue. 146 In doing so, it noted
that in a regime of concurrent state and local regulation, local legislation would be overridden only if it "directly and inherently"
conflicted with state law. 147 Furthermore, although courts consistently defer to local zoning authority, giving it "great play,"1 48 the
Sewage Facilities Act expressly forbids municipalities from enacting "inconsistent" ordinances. 49 With this statement, it appeared
that the Court read the consistency provision of the Act to apply to
all local regulation, including land use and companion regulation
alike. Beyond giving deference to local zoning authority, the
Court never considered whether a land use ordinance might address matters distinct from those at the heart of the Sewage Facilities Act. Regardless, the Court determined that, under a broad
interpretation of "public sanitary sewer system," the ordinance
was consistent with the Act.150
The Benham Court worked hard to interpret the zoning ordinance in a way that would allow it to coexist with the Sewage Facilities Act. Yet, the case implied that when courts are dealing
with possible conflicts between state environmental regulations
and local zoning ordinances, the specific provisions of each lawrather than the laws' overarching objectives-are the primary focus. Although the Court did not discuss, in general terms,
whether the goals of zoning conflict with the Commonwealth's environmental policies, its acknowledgment that courts give "great
play" to zoning ordinances and typically interpret them to preserve their validity adds to the mix of principles used in these
types of disputes.
The Commonwealth Court has more readily embraced the distinction between environmental regulation and land use regulation, albeit with mixed results. In two cases, the court expressly
146. Id. at 315.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. (referring to 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 750.8(b)(9) (2003)).
150. Benham, 523 A.2d at 315-18. The phrase "public sanitary sewer system" was not
specifically defined in the ordinance. Id. at 315. The Court freely applied the principles of
the Statutory Construction Act, despite the fact that, by its own terms, the Act does not
apply to ordinances. Id. Three of the interpretive rules the Court applied were the application of plain meaning to undefined statutory terms, the strict construction of zoning ordinances "because they are in derogation of common law and restrict the use of land," and the
interpretation of zoning ordinances sensibly "to preserve their validity." Id. at 315-17.
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focused on the difference between environmental and land use
objectives to allow zoning restrictions and environmental regulatory programs to coexist. In Warner Co. v. Zoning HearingBoard,
the court upheld the setback and special exception portions of a
zoning ordinance that applied to a quarry, despite the quarry
owner's argument that they were preempted by the Noncoal Surface Mining Conservation and Reclamation Act. 151 Based on express language in the Act that preempted all regulation of surface
mining, 152 the court, in an opinion authored by President Judge
Craig, invalidated those portions of the ordinance that regulated
surface mining operations but upheld the setback and special exception provisions as "traditional land use regulations" that were
neither preempted nor unreasonable. 153 Later in the same year,
the court rejected a preemption challenge under the state Flood
Plain Management Act in Appeal of Hoover.154 The focus in that
case was a township zoning ordinance that imposed numerous
floodplain conservation controls, including one that restricted land
uses in floodplains. 155 Judge Smith, writing for the court, held
that the Act neither preempted local legislation nor conflicted with
the ordinance, reasoning that the ordinance regulated land use,
rather than the structural components of public utility service fa156
cilities, which were the focus of the Act.
In 2006, the Commonwealth Court arrived at a different conclusion in deciding a preemption and conflict challenge under the Nutrient Management Act ("NMA"). In Burkholder v. Zoning Hearing Board,'57 a landowner once again targeted a zoning setback
that was more stringent than the NMA standard. 158 The NMA
includes a confusing preemption provision that states its provisions "are of Statewide concern and occupy the whole field of regulation . . . to the exclusion of all local regulations."'' 59 It further
provides, however, that no local ordinance may regulate the "storage, handling or land application of animal manure . . . or ... the
construction, location or operation of facilities used for storage of
151. Warner Co. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 612 A.2d 578 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992), appeal
denied, 624 A.2d 112 (Pa. 1993).
152. Warner Co., 612 A.2d at 580-81 (relying on Miller & Son Paving to analyze the
statute's language).
153. Id. at 582, 584-85.
154. 608 A.2d 607 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992).
155. Hoover, 608 A.2d at 608.
156. Id. at 609.
157. 902 A.2d 1006 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006).
158. Burkholder, 902 A.2d at 1010.
159. Id. at 1013 (quoting 3 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1717 (2008)).
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animal manure . . . if the municipal ordinance or regulation is in
conflict" with the NMA or its regulations. 16 0 This language mistakenly suggests that preemption and supremacy are one and the
same and reflects the common misunderstanding of the two concepts. If the intent is to preempt local legislation, then no local
laws are allowed, regardless of whether they conflict with the
state law. The holding in Burkholder echoed the statute's confusion: "In light of... the express language of [the NMA's] preemption provision, . . . it is clear the General Assembly intended to
preempt local regulation of manure storage facilities which conflicts with and is more stringent than the NMA and its regula61
tions."1
The court focused on the preemption provision language referring to the "location" of facilities and held that the zoning setbacks
that applied to any of the landowner's structures governed by the
Act were both in conflict with and more stringent than the NIVA
regulatory setbacks, and they were accordingly "preempted."'162
Burkholder did expressly what Benham implied was possible. It
invalidated a local land use ordinance that conflicted with a state
environmental regulation by examining specific provisions of each
law without investigating their arguably different objectives.
Judge Friedman's dissenting opinion did not disagree with the
majority's approach; rather, it argued that the NMA's setback
provisions merely set minimum location standards and that the
more stringent zoning setbacks were therefore consistent with the
regulations.163
The preemption/conflict confusion in Burkholder is not entirely
benign. Regarding the majority opinion, one could argue that a
misunderstanding or conflation of the two concepts is harmless
because the local setback was invalidated. Whether it failed because of preemption or conflict is immaterial. Still, if the court
had chosen to consider whether the NMA did, in fact, preempt the
field, its analysis may have been more efficient, because a holding
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1015. The court did not attempt to clarify the preemption provision to determine whether true preemption was intended, or whether it reflected basic supremacy principles. The provision is ambiguous as to whether the legislative intent was to preempt or to
establish concurrency; however, given the harshness of preemption and the rule that it
must be clearly intended, it is unlikely a court would hold the language establishes either
express or implied preemption.
162. Burkholder, 902 A.2d at 1016.
163. Id. at 1022 n.8 (Friedman, J., dissenting). The dissent also disagreed with the
majority's decision as to whether the landowner's facilities were governed by the NMA. Id.
At 1019-21
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that the Act preempted local setbacks would obviate the need to
address conflict. Efficiency concerns aside, a more substantive
danger arises in situations where a local ordinance can be read to
be consistent with the state law. The Burkholder dissent, for example, would have upheld the zoning ordinance under such a rationale. However, if the majority had conducted a preemption
analysis and found field preemption that was extensive enough to
ban local land use laws, no local legislation would be allowed, and
there would be no need to discuss conflict. Even though it may
have been construed to be consistent with the NMA, the setback
provision would have been unlawful. Thus, a failure to properly
distinguish between preemption and conflict may, in some cases,
lead courts to uphold local laws that should otherwise be invalidated.
Judicial failure to consider the general objectives of competing
environmental and land use laws is also a concern. Not only does
it offend the interpretive canon that directs courts dealing with
conflict to fully consider the consequences of various interpretations, 6 4 but it also ignores the general supremacy principle that
permits local regulation when "appropriate to the necessities of
65
the particular locality."'
D.

Synthesis

Pennsylvania's preemption law is generally stable. After fiftyplus years, Western Pennsylvania RestaurantAssociation remains
the cornerstone of preemption and supremacy doctrine. Over the
years, preemption has been increasingly viewed as harsh, and it is
clear that state legislation does not, by itself, create a presumption
of preemption. Pennsylvania decisional law reflects this grudging
attitude toward preemption, recognizing it in only three areas.
Despite this stability, cases continue to intermingle preemption
and supremacy concepts, a practice that can affect both judicial
efficiency and case outcomes. Furthermore, judicial treatment of
the distinction between land use and environmental law remains
unsettled.
The cases do reflect an analytical progression, although no single process is consistently applied. Cases like Mars, which
squarely address conflicts between state laws and municipal ordinances on the same subject, have resolved the preemption issue by
164.
165.

See Ogontz, 483 A.2d at 455.
W Pa. Rest. Ass'n, 77 A.2d at 620.
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first interpreting the state legislation. If there is no preemption, a
court will then consider the nature of the local power at issue using principles of statutory interpretation. If the municipality has
acted within its authority, the court will consider whether the
ordinance is reasonable, and if so, whether it nevertheless conflicts with the state law. If there is a conflict, the ordinance will
fail under supremacy principles. Other cases, such as School District of Philadelphiaand Ogontz, which deal with overlapping land
use powers, examine local authority before addressing preemption.
The significance of the sequence in which the pieces of a preemption analysis are analyzed will be discussed more fully in Parts IV
and V.
Regardless of the analytical progression, Ogontz makes clear
that statutory construction is the sole tool for dealing with these
issues. One notable interpretive rule treats state agencies and
166
local municipalities as equal delegatees of state police powers;
another resolves disputes by focusing on the consequences of invalidating local law. 167 These rules might play a significant role in
resolving disputes if courts would look at competing state and local provisions within the larger context of the policies embodied in
enabling legislation. In overlapping land use authority cases, for
example, deference to land use authority and the acknowledgment
that zoning deals with the peculiarities of local communities have
168
preserved local authority in the face of preemption challenges.
In environmental-land use disputes, however, Pennsylvania courts
have not consistently considered the distinction between the policies underlying land use and environmental regulation, at times
narrowly focusing on specific conflicting provisions in the state
and local laws. In these cases, the "great play" that the courts
otherwise give local land use authority is not always "in play."
This lack of deference to local authority in environmental-land use
disputes is significant because the distinction could defeat a preemption attack if, for example, a court held that express or field
preemption encompassed environmental matters rather than land
use matters. 169 Even in cases in which courts find concurrency,
the distinction might help to avoid the finding of conflict under
0
similar reasoning. 17
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

See City of Pittsburgh,360 A.2d at 610.
See Ogontz, 483 A.2d at 455.
See Sch.'Dist. of Phila., 207 A.2d at 868.
See, e.g., Warner Co., 612 A.2d at 578.
See, e.g., Appeal of Hoover, 608 A.2d 607 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992).
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III. THE SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT ACT: STATUTORY
PROVISIONS, REGULATIONS, AND CASE LAW

The observations set forth above are played out in SWMA preemption case law. However, these cases are given special attention because they involve an area where the line separating land
use and environmental regulation is becoming harder to draw.
That lack of clarity has had a determinative effect in a number of
cases. Before those cases are addressed, however, portions of the
Act and regulations will be summarized in order to place the case
law in better context.
A.

Pennsylvania's Solid Waste Management Act171 and Munici172
pal Waste Planning,Recycling and Waste Reduction Act

In enacting the SWMA, the General Assembly was mindful of
the health and environmental dangers caused by the improper
management of solid waste. 173 One of the Act's stated objectives is
the protection of public health, safety, and welfare from improper
solid waste management practices. 174 The Act envisions a cooperative venture between the state and local governments in a variety of areas, including solid waste planning. 175 It defines "municipalities" as cities, boroughs, incorporated towns, townships,
categories of solid waste: muand counties, 176 and creates three
77
hazardous.1
and
nicipal, residual,
State authority under the Act, which lies with the Department
of Environmental Protection ("DEP"), is extensive. The DEP administers a comprehensive solid waste program that addresses the
storage, collection, transport, processing, treatment, and disposal
of solid waste. 178 In carrying out these powers, the DEP issues
permits for municipal, residual, and hazardous waste management, 179 as well as for the beneficial processing of waste where
"such use does not harm or present a threat of harm to the health,

171. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6018.101-6018.1003 (2003).
172. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 4000.10-4000.1904 (2003).
173. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6018.102 (2003).
174. § 6018.102(4).
175. Id. at (1).
176. § 6018.103.
177. The definitions of these three types of waste can be found in § 6018.103.
178. § 6018.104(1).
179. §§ 6018.201, 6018.301, 6018.401.
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safety or welfare of the people or environment of this Common80
wealth."
Additionally, the Act empowers the Environmental Quality
Board ("EQB") to promulgate rules in furtherance of the Act's objectives, specifically, to protect the "safety health, welfare, and
property of the public and the air, water and other natural resources of the Commonwealth."'181 Like the DEP, the EQB is directed to use its authority under the Act to protect the environment and public health of the Commonwealth as a whole. The
EQB also authorizes certificates of public necessity for hazardous
waste treatment facilities, which supersede local zoning or other
18 2
land use laws that might otherwise ban such facilities.
Municipal regulatory powers over solid waste are set forth in
the Municipal Waste Planning, Recycling and Waste Reduction
Act. The law authorizes municipalities (other than counties) to
regulate the transportation, collection, and storage of municipal
waste within their borders. 183 Additionally, any ordinance enacted
pursuant to that authority "shall not be less stringent than, and
not in violation of or inconsistent with, the provisions and purposes of the [SWMA]."18 4 Notably absent from the powers given to
municipalities is the power to regulate the disposalof solid waste.
The SWMA regulations most often at issue in preemption disputes establish setbacks that mandate minimum distances between solid waste facilities and various land uses and geographic
formations. Setbacks under those regulations exist for five municipal solid waste activities: landfills, 85 sewage sludge land application, 86 solid waste transfer facilities, 87 general composting
facilities, 8 8 and resource recovery facilities. 89 Setbacks may be as
small as 100 feet-the minimum distance between a municipal
landfill and a perennial stream or a property line' 9 0 -and as large
as 10,000 feet-the distance between a landfill and an airport
180. § 6018.104(18) (emphasis added).
181. § 6018.105(a) (emphasis added).
182. Id. at (f),
(h).
183. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4000.304 (2008).
184. § 4000.304(b).
185. 25 PA. CODE § 273.202 (2005). There are separate regulations for municipal waste
landfills and construction/demolition waste landfills.
See generally PENNSYLVANIA
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & PRACTICE 13-2.2.4 (Terry R. Bossert & Joel R. Burcat eds., 4th ed.
2006).
186. 25 PA. CODE § 275.202 (1997).
187. Id. § 279.202.
188. Id. § 281.202.
189. Id. § 283.202.
190. § 273.202(a)(12), (13).
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57

192
runway. 19 1 The regulations also mandate setbacks from schools
and occupied dwellings.1 93 Similar restrictions exist for residual
waste processing and disposal facilities. 94 Even though these restrictions are often described as "setbacks," the regulations refer
to them as "areas" where various solid waste activities "[are] prohibited."1 95 In short, the regulations establish areas where solid
waste management activities may not be undertaken based on the
DEP's and EQB's determination that those areas must remain
open to protect the public health and the environment. As such,
they can fairly be described as regulations that restrict the operation of solid waste facilities based on statewide environmental
concerns, rather than land use regulations.

B.

Preemption Cases

Numerous cases have addressed preemption or conflict under
the SWMA. The cases are divided between companion regulation
cases, where municipalities sought to regulate solid waste in order
to supplement the Act, and environmental-land use disputes,
where municipal land use ordinances were challenged as conflicting with the Act.
1.

Companion Regulation Cases

In the early 1970s, the Solid Waste Act allowed municipalities
to regulate the disposal of solid waste as long as their ordinances
did not conflict with the Act.1 96 A township's license requirement
was challenged under that Act in Greater Greensburg Sewage Authority v. Hempfield Township.197 The Greensburg Sewage Authority had obtained a state permit for the land application of
sewage sludge but was denied a local license.1 98 Intertwining pre191. Id. (a)(14).
192. Id. (a)(18)
193. See, e.g., 25 PA. CODE § 273.202(a)(9),(10) (establishing 900 foot setbacks between
landfill expansions and new landfills and occupied dwellings).
194. See, e.g., 25 PA. CODE § 289.422 (2001) (listing areas where residual waste disposal
impoundments are prohibited).
195. The title of each of the regulations uses this language. See 25 PA. CODE §§ 273.202,
275.202, 279.202, 281.202, 283.202.
196. See Greater Greensburg Sewage Auth. v. Hempfield Twp., 291 A.2d 318, 321 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1972). Some cases predate the 1980 effective date of the current Act but are
discussed because of their handling of preemption issues. As noted in the text above, the
SWMA in its current version does not authorize local regulation of solid waste disposal.
197. 291 A.2d at 319.
198. Id.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 47

emption and supremacy, the Commonwealth Court stated that the
SWMA "resulted in a limited preemption" of sewage sludge disposal because the statute provided that no municipality could enact an ordinance that conflicted with the Commonwealth's licensure requirement. 199 The court cited both the supremacy rule
from Western Pennsylvania Restaurant Association and the field
preemption rule, eventually settling on limited field preemption to
support its holding that the local license requirement was invalid.200 It reasoned that "[aill phases" of the sewage facility's operations were governed by the state licensure requirements under the
2
Sewage Facilities Act and the Solid Waste Act. 01
Twelve years later, in Sunny Farms Ltd. v. North Codorus
Township,20 2 the Commonwealth Court construed the SWIA to
establish concurrency rather than preemption. 203 A township's
ordinance, enacted under its police power, banned solid waste incineration and land disposal within 500 yards of certain structures, including dwellings. 204 Sunny Farms, which hoped to build
a hazardous waste facility within the setback, brought a preemption challenge. 20 5 The court held that the SWMA did not expressly
preempt local legislation, with the exception of the certificate of
public necessity provisions that would restrict local prohibitions of
hazardous waste facilities. 20 6 Aside from that limited preemption,
local regulation of solid waste management was permitted as long
as it did "not effect stricter geological and engineering standards
than the state."20 7 The court allowed the local ordinance to stand
under a supremacy analysis because it believed that the scope of
the ordinance, "[a]s with general zoning regulations," included
objectives that were broader than the SWMA's "narrow, technical,
engineering concerns. 20 8
199. Id. at 321.
200. Id.
201. GreaterGreensburg, 291 A.2d at 321.
202. 474 A.2d 56 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984).
203. Sunny Farms, 474 A.2d at 58.
204. Id. There is some confusion as to whether the ordinance at issue was a police
power regulation or a zoning regulation; however, the better conclusion is that the ordinance was a police power regulation. See Liverpool Twp. v. Stephens, 900 A.2d 1030, 104041 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006) (Pellegrini, J., dissenting).
205. Sunny Farms, 474 A.2d at 58.
206. Id. at 59. The court relied on Greene Township v. Kuhl, 379 A.2d 1383 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1977), and Moyer's Landfill v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 450 A.2d 273 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1982), for the proposition that the SWMA did not preempt state law. Both cases were
zoning cases.
207. Sunny Farms, 474 A.2d at 59.
208. Id. at 60.
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The Sunny Farms court elaborated on the scope of a municipality's authority to regulate land use and environmental matters. It
reasoned that the ordinance was aligned with traditional land use
goals because it promoted "public health, property values and aesthetics." 20 9 In describing municipal environmental powers, the
court noted, "Aesthetics and environmental well-being are important aspects of the quality of life in our society, and a key role of
local government is to promote and protect life's quality for all of
its inhabitants." 210 The court found no conflict because the ordinance did not address geological and engineering standards and
because the Second Class Township Code authorized the township
to regulate in furtherance of the public health, property values,
and aesthetics. 2 11 The court drew a clear line between the narrow
geological and engineering standards authorized by the SWMA
and the broader standards restricting location based on a reason212
able exercise of a municipality's police powers.
Although Sunny Farms cleared the way for local regulation of
the location of solid waste facilities under municipal police powers,
the case called for a much more exacting review of local regulation
of solid waste facility operations. In the year following the Sunny
Farms decision, two municipal ordinances that attempted to regulate the operation of solid waste facilities were invalidated, extending the preemptive reach of the SWMA. In Municipality of
Monroeville v. Chambers Development Corporation,21 3 a city ordi2 14
nance that regulated landfill hours of operation was at issue.
The Commonwealth Court noted that case law under the current
and prior versions of the Act established that local zoning was not
preempted. 21 5 Monroeville's ordinance, however, attempted to
regulate the operation of the landfill. 21 6 The court noted that the
Act called for state and local cooperation and allowed local governments to regulate the storage and collection of solid waste, but
was silent on municipal authority to regulate disposal. This silence demonstrated to the court "that the legislature did not intend municipalities to have the power to regulate any aspects of
209. Id. (citing Franklin Twp. v. Dep't of Envtl. Res., 452 A.2d 718, 720 (Pa. 1982)).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Sunny Farms, 474 A.2d at 61.
213. 491 A.2d 307 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985).
214. Monroeville, 491 A.2d. at 309.
215. Id. at 309-10 (citing Sunny Farms, 474 A.2d 56; Kuhl, 379 A.2d 1383; and Greater
Greensburg,291 A.2d at 318).
216. Id. at 310.
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the operation of a sanitary landfill." 2 17 In a single-paragraph opinion shortly thereafter, the Commonwealth Court invalidated a
Ross Township non-zoning ordinance that similarly attempted to
regulate landfill operations. 2 18 Importantly, both cases expressly
held that the SWIA preempted local regulation of solid waste
disposal, 219 apparently foreclosing local regulation of waste disposal operations, even if consistent with the Act. As such, these
cases moved beyond the court's view in Sunny Farms that the
SWMA established a regime of concurrency with the sole exception relating to the certificate of necessity.
In Hydropress, previously discussed in Section II, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued a plurality opinion on the preemptive
scope of the SWIA. 220 On one hand, the case solidified intergovernmental cooperation and power sharing as an anti-preemption
indicator. On the other hand, it introduced the threat of balkanization as a rationale for finding implied preemption. The township ordinance at issue required those engaged in the land application of biosolids to be bonded and required landowners, generators, haulers, and applicators who were not owners to pay for road
improvements. 221 The ordinance was, in essence, a companion
regulation rather than a zoning ordinance. The justices in Hydropress who rejected preemption did so because there was no express
language in the SWMA to that effect. 222 They pointed to numerous provisions in the Act that established state and local power
sharing and cooperation, leading them to proclaim, "This is the
language of intergovernmental coordination and cooperation, not
of preemption." 223 These justices never reached the issue of implied preemption nor that of partial preemption of operational
regulations. For them, the pivotal concern was whether the municipality had the authority to pass the ordinance, and they held
that it did not. 224 Conversely, the justices who held that the Act
217. Id. at 311.
218. Twp. of Ross v. Crown Wrecking Co., Inc., 500 A.2d 1293, 1293 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1985).
219. Monroeville, 491 A.2d at 311 (barring "any" municipal regulation of landfill operations); Ross, 500 A.2d 1293 (holding that local regulation of landfills was "preempted" by
the Act).
220. Hydropress, 836 A.2d 912 (Pa. 2003).
221. Id. at 914-15. The township was rural and had numerous dirt roads that had not
been improved. Id. at 914.
222. Id. at 918-19.
223. Id. at 919.
224. Id. at 919-20. Relying on Ashenfelder, the Court took a narrow view of municipal
powers, noting that the Second Class Township Code does not delegate unlimited powers to
townships, especially those powers retained by the state. Id. at 919. Using that principle
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preempted local authority read the Act as merely encouraging cooperation between the state and municipalities, 225 which was considerably less than "an implied delegation of power to units of local government to add levels of regulation beyond that which is
specifically authorized in the SWMA." 226 They viewed the Act as
establishing a "pervasive" regulatory program to be administered
by the DEP "as the expert," 227 and rejected concurrency, in part,
because of a fear of a patchwork of "onerous regulations propounded by the myriad of local governmental entities, unskilled in
this area, which exist in this Commonwealth . .. ,"228
Because it is a plurality opinion, Hydropress has no precedential
effect, a point mentioned in Synagro-WWT, Inc. v. Rush Township229 later that same year. 230 In Synagro, the United States District Court was asked to consider the possible preemption of a local ordinance by various federal and state statutes, including the
SWMA. 231 The plaintiff, which treated biosolids and applied them
to mine reclamation sites, had obtained DEP permits for its activities.232 Thereafter, the township enacted an ordinance regulating
the land application of sewage sludge, purporting to protect its
residents' health, safety, and general welfare by decreasing their
233
exposure to harmful materials.
The federal court recited the rules set forth in Western Pennsylvania RestaurantAssociation and Mars,234 as well as the five questions from Duff, describing them as a tool used by "lower Pennsylvania courts" when dealing with "preemption" issues. 235 The court

as a guide, the justices held the Township Code could not be read to allow the township to
impose road improvement charges on those who are general users of the road, and further
rejected the bonding requirement because the SWA gives the DEP the authority to require permit applicants to post financial security. Id. at 920.
225. Hydropress, 836 A.2d at 920-21 (Castile, J., concurring and dissenting).
226. Id. at 920.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 921. Justice Castille, writing for these justices, also agreed that the ordinance was, in any event, ultra vires. Id.
229. Synagro-WWT, Inc. v. Rush Twp., 299 F.Supp.2d 410 (M.D. Pa. 2003).
230. Synagro-WWT, 299 F.Supp.2d at 418.
231. Id. at 412-13.
232. Id. at 413.
233. Id. Among other things, the ordinance required applicants to provide the township
with two documents: a site registration, which stated that the application site met all federal, state, and local regulations pertaining to biosolid land application, and a second called
the land application registration. Id. at 414. To complete the documentation, the applicant
had to submit all DEP permit application information, undertake comprehensive testing of
soil and groundwater, and furnish reports detailing test results. Id.
234. Id. at 416.
235. Synagro-WWT, 299 F.Supp.2d at 416.
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found no express preemption language in the SWMVIA and proceeded to a conflict analysis without considering the possibility of
implied preemption. 236 The court then perpetuated the confusion
that marks many of these cases. It acknowledged precedent that
holds that any municipal regulation of solid waste facility operations is "preempted," but it interpreted those cases to mean that
any regulation that is an obstacle to the objectives of the Act or
"that would impede the day-to-day operations of a waste facility"
was not allowed. 237 This analysis suggests concurrency, not preemption.
The misunderstanding intertwined itself in the court's analysis.
The court held that one provision of the ordinance was "preempted" by the Act because it duplicated DEP permits and was an
obstacle to the Act's "goal of orderly and efficient land application
of sewage sludge." 238 However, the court let another provision
stand because it was consistent with the purposes of the Act and
did not conflict with DEP regulations. 239 The court failed to recognize that, if the SWMA preempts local supplemental regulation,
it would make no difference whether the township's ordinance was
an obstacle or not. Any ordinance that addresses biosolid land
application would be invalid. The court's analysis was clearly
clouded by the Duff questions, particularly those focusing on conflict. 240
In 2006, the Commonwealth Court confronted these issues yet
again in Liverpool Township v. Stephens,241 a case that perpetuated the preemption/conflict confusion and strained the distinction
between environmental and land use regulation. In Liverpool, the
township's ordinance banned the storage, transfer, collection or
disposal of solid or residual waste without a permit and also regulated the application of processed municipal waste as fertilizer to
farmland by mandating setbacks that were more stringent than

236. See id. at 418-19.
237. Id. at 419. The "obstacle" rule was attributed to Klein v. Straban Twp., 705 A.2d
947, 949-50 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998).
238. Synagro-WWT, 299 F.Supp.2d at 419 (invalidating the land application registration). The court also held that provisions in the ordinance setting pH limitations were
preempted since they conflicted with those in the Act. Id. at 421.
239. Id. at 421 (upholding the site registration requirement). Enforcement provisions in
the ordinance were also held valid because the Act intended municipalities to assist the
DEP in compliance matters. Id. at 422.
240. See id. at 419-21.
241. 900 A.2d 1030 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006).
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the setbacks included in the SWMA regulations. 242 A landowner
who had obtained a DEP permit for these activities without obtaining a local permit was sued by the township. Predictably, the
landowner claimed that he did not need a township permit be243
cause the SWMA preempted local regulation.
The court, in an opinion by Judge Leavitt, noted that Hydropress was not binding, but pointed out that six justices agreed that
the township in that case had no authority to duplicate DEP's
regulatory program under the SWMA. 244 The court then turned to
Duff s five questions to determine whether there was preemption,
claiming that if any one of the questions was answered affirmatively, "then the local ordinance will be found preempted by state
law." 245 Again, the court presented the questions as relevant to
preemption alone, not conflict.
The township relied on the absence of preemption language in
the statute as well as the Sunny Farms decision, in which the
same court held that a local setback ordinance did not conflict
with the Act's "engineering or geological standards," in part because the locally focused objectives of the ordinance differed from
those of the Act. 246 The Liverpool court agreed that the SWMA did
not preempt local zoning regulation, opining that Sunny Farms
involved a zoning ordinance. 24 7 However, it construed the Liverpool ordinance as one that regulated the activity of sludge application, rather than its "placement," since it included "geological
standards" that addressed "how[,] when[,] and where sewage
waste may be used to fertilize farmland." 248 The court reasoned
that any such standard, if stricter than those in the state regulations, cannot survive. 249 As in Sunny Farms, the court was willing
to uphold local operational regulations that are consistent with
the SWMA, unlike Municipality of Monroeville, in which the court
250
held that the Act foreclosed all local operational regulation.
242. Liverpool Twp., 900 A.2d at 1031-32 (noting that the township ordinance barred
land application within 500 yards of a dwelling).
243. Id. at 1032.
244. Id. at 1033.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 1035. See discussion of Sunny Farms, infra, where the court distinguished
between the technical objectives of the SWMA regulations and the broader township goals
to protect health, property values, and aesthetics. See supra text accompanying note 207.
247. See Liverpool Twp., 900 A.2d at 1035-36.
248. Id. at 1036.
249. Id.
250. See Liverpool Twp., 900 A.2d at 1038; see also Municipality of Monroeville, 491 A.2d
at 311.
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The Liverpool decision initially appears to hinge on the type of
ordinance at issue. Zoning ordinances are permissible, but any
ordinance not so labeled which can be construed as dealing with
operational activities or geological standards will be invalid if it is
more stringent than state law. 251 The court broadly defined operational regulations to include provisions that specify where sewage
waste may be used as fertilizer. 252 Although the opinion initially
described Sunny Farms as a case dealing with a zoning ordinance,
it nevertheless stated that the rule of that case would apply
"[riegardless" of whether Liverpool's ordinance was a zoning ordinance, but only if the ordinance regulated the "placement" of a
solid waste facility in order to protect aesthetics and property values. 253 As noted, the court instead ruled that the Liverpool ordinance addressed operations. The court arguably was more concerned about what the ordinance addressed than how it was labeled. Local restrictions that address the location of solid waste
facilities are permissible whether they are found in environmental
or zoning ordinances. Ordinances that address facility operations,
however, can be no more stringent than state law.
An intermingling of preemption and supremacy concepts permeate the Liverpool opinion. The court seemed to have affirmatively answered two Duff questions dealing with conflict, yet concluded that the Act "preempted" the ordinance. 254 The court also
claimed that the ordinance not only conflicted with the Act but
also interfered with the goal of "uniform and comprehensive" state
regulation "that leaves no room for side-by-side municipal regulation." 255 As in many of these cases, the opinion causes the reader
to ask, 'Which is it, preemption or conflict?" The court never
clearly established that the SWIA preempted local operational
regulation of solid waste facilities, and the court strongly suggested it does not. If it had found preemption, the court could
have ended the discussion by characterizing the ordinance as imposing a geological standard as opposed to restricting location, and
there would have been no need to address conflict.
The court's conclusion that a local setback provision was a geological standard that regulated a solid waste activity is difficult to
accept. In a strong dissenting opinion, Judge Pelligrini argued
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

Liverpool Twp., 900 A.2d at 1036.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 1037-38.
Id. at 1038 (citing Duff, 532 A.2d at 505).
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that the ordinance dealt with odor, not geology, and that municipalities are authorized to use their police powers to regulate the
placement of sewage sludge. 256 He wrote that the General Assembly understood that "administrative regulations issued by DEP do
not take into consideration local conditions and only deal with the
operation of waste sites[.]' 257 He felt that the case was no different than Sunny Farms, which characterized the DEP's concerns
under the SWMA as narrow and technological, quite distinct from
township efforts to regulate solid waste facilities to improve the
community's quality of life. 258 Importantly, the dissent noted that
a local government's "major responsibility" when regulating environmental matters is to address "[a]esthetics and environmental
259
well-being" as part of community quality of life.
Liverpool, which is one of the most recent pronouncements on
preemption and conflict under the SWMA, is also one of the most
confusing. Without any analysis of express or implied preemption,
the majority opinion set forth a conflict analysis and ultimately
concluded that the ordinance was "preempted." The opinion taxes
common sense in its characterization of the township's setback
provision as a geological standard and leaves unresolved the issue
of whether the SWMA's preemptive scope is limited to its restriction on hazardous waste facilities under the certificate of necessity
provisions (as held in Sunny Farms and Synagro) or additionally
forecloses all local regulation of solid waste facility operations, as
held in GreaterGreensburg and Municipalityof Monroeville.
2.

Environmental-ZoningCases

The Commonwealth Court has consistently upheld local land
use ordinances in the face of preemption challenges brought under
the SWMA. Although these cases have uniformly held that the
Act does not preempt local land use authority, they have left unresolved the issue of SWMA preemption of operational regula260
tions.

256. Liverpool Twp., 900 A.2d at 1038-40 (Pellegrini, J., dissenting).
257. Id. at 1038.
258. Id. at 1040-42.
259. Id. at 1042 (citing Franklin Twp., 452 A.2d at 720).
260. See Se. Chester County Refuse Auth. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 545 A.2d 445, 446-47
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988) (noting that, under the Act, municipalities may regulate with a goal
of keeping communities safe and clean, but may not impose conditions that will interfere
with a solid waste facility's operation).
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When municipalities have acted within the confines of their
delegated land use authority and avoided operational regulation,
they have invariably prevailed in SWMA preemption disputes. 261
In these cases, the distinction between environmental regulation
and land use regulation is often determinative. One landowner
learned this lesson twice. In Greene Township v. Kuhl,262 the
Commonwealth Court held that a landowner who had obtained a
DEP permit for a landfill also had to seek zoning approval from
the township. 263 The court found no intent in the SWMA to preempt local zoning regulations and cited with approval the trial
court's rationale:
[A] local municipality cannot set geological or engineering
standards stricter than those established by DER for issuance
of its permit. However, factors other than geological ones,
such as those involving aesthetics, population density, and accessibility[,] govern the selection of a landfill site, and these
factors are the appropriate subject of local land use plan264
ning.
Several years later, the landowner raised the same argument,
this time relying on Greensburg Sewage Authority, where the
court invalidated a local zoning ordinance that attempted to regulate sewage facilities. 265 The court easily dismissed the argument,
stating that, unlike the ordinance at issue in Greensburg, the
Greene Township ordinance did not "regulate the means by which
landfills dispose of their waste; it speaks only to where they may
266
be located."
The Commonwealth Court has repeatedly drawn the line between the environmental regulation of the SWMA and local zoning
authority. As it stated in a non-preemption case arising under the
Act:
261. Outcomes that are favorable to municipalities depend on compliance with the procedural requirements of the MPC. See, e.g., Longenecker v. Pine Grove Landfill, Inc., 543
A.2d 215 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988). In Longenecker, a landfill operator challenged a local
setback provision that was included in a non-zoning ordinance. Id. The township had no
comprehensive plan or zoning ordinance. Id. at 215. The court held that the SWMA preserved a municipality's power to adopt "appropriate" zoning regulations that address "matters of a purely local character," but invalidated the ordinance as being an act of zoning
that failed to comply with the MPC's procedural requirements. Id. at 216-17.
262. 379 A.2d 1383 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1977).
263. Greene Twp., 379 A.2d at 1384.
264. Id. at 1385.
265. Kuhl v. Commonwealth, 467 A.2d 912, 913 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983).
266. Kuhl, 467 A.2d at 913.
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The grant of a permit by the DER is not tantamount to a zoning permit. To hold otherwise, would undercut the purpose of
a zoning board in reviewing whether a proposed use would be
contrary to a particularzoning district'scitizens' health, safety
267
and welfare.
Thus, it is not surprising that in Hill v. Zoning Hearing
Board,268 the court allowed a zoning authority, when authorizing
the expansion of a solid waste facility that was a preexisting use,
to impose land use conditions on the facility even though the use
269
was permitted by the DER.
In 2006, the Commonwealth Court decided yet another case
challenging setback and height restrictions in a local zoning ordinance. In Southeastern Chester County Refuse Authority v. Zoning
HearingBoard,270 the Refuse Authority, which had been operating
a landfill that failed to comply with a 200-foot zoning setback, applied for an expansion permit. 27 1 The township denied the application based on zoning setbacks that were more stringent than the
setbacks included in the SWMA regulations.2 7 2 The court upheld
the zoning board's denial, reiterating that the regulations did not
preempt local zoning ordinance provisions "that are consistent
with basic land use planning principles promoting and protecting
273
the public health, property values, and aesthetics."
In these environmental-land use preemption cases under the
SWMA, local action is more easily tolerated than it is in companion regulation cases, where often it is either struck down as operational or subjected to scrutiny under principles of conflict. This
difference is illustrated in Township of Plymouth v. County of
Montgomery,274 a case involving a challenge brought against four
267. Abbey v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 559 A.2d 107, 111 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989) (emphasis
in original) (upholding, against a citizen challenge, a zoning board's approval of a waste-toenergy facility as a special exception).
268. 597 A.2d 1245 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991).
269. Hill, 597 A.2d at 1252. The facility was a valid preexisting use. Id. at 1248. The
conditions prohibited obnoxious odors and mandated that the facility be kept clean and that
trash transfers and compacting occur inside the building. Id. at 1252. Nevertheless, the
court invalidated other conditions purported to address land use because there was no
evidence they furthered the promotion of the public health, safety, or welfare. Id. at 125253 (holding sound barrier requirement unlawful). The case serves as a reminder that any
exercise of the zoning authority must be rationally related to the police powers.
270. 898 A.2d 680 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006), appeal denied, 921 A.2d 499 (Pa. 2007).
271. Chester County Refuse Auth., 898 A.2d at 683.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 686.
274. Twp. of Plymouth v. County of Montgomery, 531 A.2d 49 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987),
appealdenied, 554 A.2d 513 (Pa. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1021 (1989).
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ordinances, including both companion environmental ordinances
and zoning ordinances. In order for Montgomery County to construct a waste management facility in Plymouth Township, the
township amended its zoning ordinance to create a resource recovery district that would allow a 165-foot-high, 1,200-ton-capacity
facility. 275 The county adopted a plan that complied with the
amendment, but the township, responding to community opposition, repealed the amended ordinance and enacted three new ordinances in its place. 276 The first of the three, a non-zoning ordinance, regulated waste processing disposal and required processors to obtain permits; the second was a zoning measure that set
maximum height and setback limits and made resource recovery
facilities conditional uses with a 250-ton-per-day capacity; and the
third shrunk the size of the original district by more than 90 percent. 2 77 The township also had another relevant ordinance, enacted under the MPC and township code, which, among other
things, required the facility to obtain building and sewer connec2 78
tion permits.
The court had little trouble invalidating the first ordinance under a pure preemption rationale. It noted that regulations pertaining to the operation of a facility did "not fall within the category of land use controls accomplished by zoning[] under the
MPC," and stated that Municipality of Monroeville established the
difference between operational regulations and those dealing with
the location of a facility. 279 Thus, the first ordinance was invalid,
as were the capacity, design, and size limits in the second ordinance. 280 The court stated that the DER's "pervasive powers" under the SWMNA "preempted" local operational regulations that address "transportation processing, treatment and disposal of solid
28 1
waste."
The court proceeded to discuss the land use powers of the township. It noted that the only land use matter preempted by the
282 It
SWMA involved the certificate of public necessity provision.
further acknowledged the importance of statutory interpretation
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.

Plymouth, 531 A.2d at 51-52.
Id. at 52.
Id.
Id. at 53.
Id. at 53-54 (citing Municipality of Monroeville, 491 A.2d 307 (Pa. Commw. Ct.

1985)).

280.
281.
282.

Plymouth, 531 A.2d at 54-55.
Id. at 54.
Id. at 55.
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in these cases, especially the canon that authorizes courts to consider, "among other things, the consequences of a particular interpretation." 28 3 The court feared that a liberal approach to preemption could subordinate local zoning authority and frustrate municipal planning. 28 4 Furthermore, the imposition of zoning restrictions on a facility owner would not frustrate a state regulatory
scheme because one site could be substituted for another. 2 85 Nevertheless, the court held that the second and third ordinances
amounted to spot zoning because they targeted a particular parcel
28 6
of land without regard for the promotion of the police powers.
More specifically, the ordinances imposed exceedingly burdensome
requirements on the resource recovery district and significantly
decreased its size. The general land use provisions of the fourth
ordinance, on the other hand, were permissible as long as they
287
were not abused.
Township of Plymouth neatly captures the strains of preemption
and conflict that drive these cases. The opinion emphasized that
the SWMA imposed a regime of partial preemption by preempting
local land use regulation to the extent of the certificate of need
provisions as well as local operational regulations. 28 That issue
remains unclear, however, because Liverpool, also decided in 2006,
suggests that consistent municipal operational regulations may be
permissible under the SWMA. What is certain from these cases is
that legitimate land use regulations are not preempted by the Act
and will generally prevail in a conflict dispute, even if specific provisions conflict with similar provisions in a SWMA regulation.
IV. SYNTHESIS: QUESTIONS, THEMES, SUGGESTIONS

Although it is possible to elicit some fairly stable legal principles
from the SWMA case law and preemption cases, the cases merit
further discussion in light of the convergence of land use and environmental policies that marks many of the disputes.

283. Id. at 55-56 (citing Ogontz, 483 A.2d at 455).
284. Id. at 55-56.
285. Plymouth, 531 A.2d at 56 (citing Ozontz, 483 A.2d at 455).
286. Id. at 56-57 (holding that spot zoning ignores the "community-wide perspective"
that is required of any exercise of the zoning power).
287. Id. at 58.
288. Although Township of Plymouth clearly spoke of preemption of local operational
regulation, other cases have suggested state and local concurrency in the matter of operational regulations. See, e.g., Sunny Farms, 474 A.2d at 59.
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Questions and Concerns
1.

Preemption/Conflict Confusion

A fair number of the cases discussed previously reflect a lack of
clarity about the distinction between preemption and conflict. 28 9
The confusion is typically revealed in statements to the effect that,
if a local law conflicts with state legislation, then it is preempted. 290 Other Pennsylvania cases have similarly held that implied preemption exists if a state law materially conflicts with local law. 29 ' Yet, a determination of preemption forecloses any and
all local law, even if the law is otherwise valid. If the SWMA preempts local regulation of solid waste facility operations, then there
can be no local operational legislation at all. If, on the other hand,
the Act intends concurrency in the realm of facility operations, a
local government may use its police power to enact supplemental
operational regulations that are consistent with the SWMA and
its regulations. Under this rationale, local companion ordinances
that supplement the SWMA with additional documentation requirements have withstood scrutiny. 292 Even this type of ordinance, however, would be invalid if preemption were intended.
The confusion has become entrenched in Commonwealth Court
jurisprudence by way of the Duff questions, which comingle inquiries that are relevant to both preemption and conflict while
claiming that they relate solely to preemption. 293 Because an affirmative answer to any one question results in a finding of preemption, 294 a court might proclaim a local ordinance to be preempted if it conflicts with a state law, regardless of the intent to
295
preempt.
Equating conflict with preemption is fairly widespread. It is
common to read statements to the effect that a state law that conflicts with federal law is preempted. 296 Extrapolating this concept
to the state-municipality setting would mean that local laws that
289. See, e.g., Synagro-WWT, 299 F.Supp.2d at 419; Liverpool Twp., 900 A.2d at 1037.
290. See supratext accompanying note 251.
291. The cases often refer to this as "conflict preemption." See Nutter v. Dougherty, 938
A.2d 401, 404 (Pa. 2007).
292. See Synagro-WWT, 299 F.Supp.2d at 421 (upholding a local site registration requirement in a local solid waste ordinance).
293. See supratext accompanying note 229.
294. Liverpool Twp., 900 A.2d at 1033.
295. See, e.g., Synagro-WWT, 299 F.Supp.2d at 419.
Furthermore, Synagro-WWT
showed that the reach of the Duff questions extends beyond the Commonwealth Court.
296. Gardbaum, supra note 2, at 809-10.
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actually conflict with state laws would also be preempted. Such
statements, which encapsulate a rule sometimes referred to as
"conflict preemption," are confusing and imprecise because conflict
rules are grounded in supremacy and have nothing to do with preemption. 297 The rationale behind these statements has substance,
however, if conflict were to be understood as "provid[ing] the necessary evidence for implying [legislative] intent to preempt [local]
law[.]" 298 Under this reasoning, implied preemption exists if there
is a conflict between a state and local land use regulation. 299 The
danger of conflict preemption is that it negates the idea of supremacy. If conflict equates to preemption, then what role is left
for supremacy? 30 0 Moreover, a search for conflict to establish preemption may distract courts from searching for express preemption language or field occupation. 30 1 Because a conflict analysis is
proper only where no express or implied preemption is present,
the concept of conflict preemption is self-contradictory and should
30 2
be abandoned.
The preemption/conflict confusion should be addressed not only
for certainty in the law but also for judicial efficiency. If a state
statute either expressly or impliedly preempts local legislation,
courts have no need to address the scope of local authority or the
often thorny question of conflict. If, for example, the SWMA preempts local operational regulations, a court might easily dispense
with any local law that it characterized as dealing with operational matters. No further analysis would be required.
2.

Analytical Consistency

Further clarity might be accomplished through a consistent progression in preemption and conflict analysis. To a great extent,
Pennsylvania's preemption cases suggest such a progression. In
some cases, courts have addressed the preemption issue first; if
there is no preemption, they proceeded to a supremacy analysis,
focusing on local authority to act and, if the action was authorized,
the reasonableness of the action.30 3 In other cases, notably those
297. Id. at 809 (referring to the misunderstanding as "sloppy and contradictory").
298. Id.
299. See 3 RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 48:4, Implied Preemption
(4th ed. 2007-2008).
300. Gardbaum, supra note 2, at 810 (noting that conflict preemption "renders the [Supremacy] clause redundant").
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. See, e.g., Mars, 740 A.2d at 196.
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involving overlapping land use authority, courts have focused first
on the type of power exercised by the municipality and then con30 4
sidered the preemption issue.
In a number of cases, however, courts have shortchanged the
preemption analysis. They have first looked for express preemption and, finding none, moved to the supremacy issue. 30 5 Because
preemption can be implied or express, courts need to consider
whether a state law that does not expressly preempt local action
nevertheless occupies the field. It was a field preemption finding,
for example, that led three justices in Hydropress to hold that the
SWVMA preempts all local regulation. 30 6 Cases like Synagro, how30 7
ever, miss this important step.
There is perhaps no substantive difference between deciding
preemption first and doing so after a discussion of local authority,
especially if a court deals with express and implied preemption
and carefully distinguishes between preemption and conflict. In
either case, the correct result can be obtained. The harshness of
and strong presumption against preemption, however, create a
legal environment that is generally favorable to local legislative
authority. 30 8 Analyzing local powers before asking whether those
powers have been stripped by state law would place the preemption question in better context than would the reverse analysis. If
an examination of the precise local powers at issue comes first, the
preemption question is better focused on those powers.
Such an approach would be particularly helpful as state and local environmental and land use interests converge. In cases of
conflict between a local land use law and a state environmental
law, a local-authority-first approach might assist a court in properly rejecting preemption based on the uniqueness of local land
use authority. By the same token, the approach might facilitate a
finding of preemption in companion regulation disputes. An examination of local power before a preemption analysis would arguably lead to fuller consideration of the local power at issue and a
more conservative approach to preemption.
A final benefit to an analysis that first examines local authority
is increased judicial efficiency. By first addressing local authority,

304. See, e.g., Ogontz, 483 A.2d at 451-52.
305. See, e.g., Hydropress, 836 A.2d at 918-19 (noting the lack of express terms of preemption in the SWMA); but see id. at 920 (plurality opinion, finding field preemption).
306. Id. at 920.
307. See supratext accompanying note 230.
308. See, e.g., Mars, 740 A.2d at 195-96.
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courts could avoid dealing with preemption altogether. This scenario would occur if it were determined that a local ordinance was
either ultra vires or unreasonable. In either case, courts would
never need to address the preemption issue, which would comport
with the norm that favors avoidance of constitutional issues
30 9
whenever possible.
3.

Indicia of Conflict

There is a serious need for Pennsylvania courts to elaborate on
the factors that are relevant to conflict. That need is intensifying
as land use and state and local environmental legislation continue
to overlap. It is clear that, if a state program is intended to operate concurrently with municipal legislation, otherwise-valid local
ordinances will nevertheless be struck down if they are inconsistent with or in conflict with state law. 3 10 Ogontz makes clear that
statutory interpretation is the sole tool to be used in making a conflict determination. 311 In that regard, Pennsylvania courts have
often turned to Pennsylvania's Statutory Construction Act to help
resolve conflict scenarios.
Ogontz, an overlapping land use case, preserved a local land use
ordinance by resorting to the canon of construction that asks
courts to consider the consequences of invalidating conflicting
laws. 31 2 The Court held that local zoning authority would be frustrated if it were routinely subordinated in cases where state programs conflict with municipal action. 3 13 The same rule of interpretation would arguably help preserve local land use authority in
environmental-land use disputes as well, but this result would not
3 14
be guaranteed.
The matter becomes more complex in environmental-land use
disputes where a state environmental law envisions coordination
with local authorities. In Township of Plymouth, for example, the
Commonwealth Court chose not to consider the consequences of
usurping local land use powers even though it acknowledged that
the SWMA affirms local zoning authority. It did so largely be309. See, e.g., Procito v. Unemployment Comp. Bd., 945 A.2d 261, 266 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2008). For example, the lead Hydropress opinion may have avoided its preemption discussion altogether by first determining that the municipality acted beyond its authority. 836
A.2d 912.
310. See, e.g., W. Pa. Rest. Ass'n, 77 A.2d at 620.
311. Ogontz, 483 A.2d at 455.
312. Id. (citing 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1921(c)(6) (2003)).
313. Id.
314. See Plymouth, 531 A.2d at 56.
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cause the Act intended local land use powers relating to solid
waste facilities to be integrated with the statewide program, an
objective the court described as a "complicating factor" in the conflict analysis. 315 The rationale implies that unfettered land use
authority may frustrate the power-sharing objectives of the
SWMA. If so, courts should carefully consider not only the consequences to local land use objectives if state law were to prevail but
also the consequences to state law objectives if local regulation
were freely allowed. Because the Township of Plymouth court ultimately invalidated the local zoning ordinance as spot zoning, the
language that gave less deference to local land use goals in light of
the cooperative policies of the SWMA is arguably dicta. The concept might nevertheless surface in other environmental-land use
disputes over state programs involving coordinated action with
municipalities, facilitating a finding of conflict while diminishing
local land use authority. The degree to which this derogation of
local power is possible has yet to be resolved.
Because conflict is so dependent on statutory interpretation,
there are other provisions of the Statutory Construction Act that
might prove relevant in environmental-land use cases. 3 16 The Act
applies only to statutes, which are specifically defined to be acts of
the General Assembly. 317 Thus, within the context of this discussion, the guides set forth in the Statutory Construction Act apply
to comparisons between state environmental laws and the legislation that authorizes local land use authority, which in most cases
is the MPC. For example, although Pennsylvania courts might
rely on the Act to resolve conflicts between DEP setback regulations under the SWMVA and conflicting local zoning setbacks, it is
preferable to step back and compare the enabling language of the
SWMA with that of the MPC. From that perspective, the question
becomes whether a law giving local governments authority to ad315. Id. at 56.
316. Legislative intent is the polestar of statutory interpretation in Pennsylvania, and to
the extent that the plain language of a statute indicates intent, it must be followed. 1 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1921(b). When intent is not clear, courts are to consider not only the
consequences of a given interpretation, but also the aim of a statute and what it seeks to
prevent. § 1921(c). Because the SWMA (and arguably all of Pennsylvania's environmental
statutes) is concerned with statewide health and environmental protection, and zoning
legislation, in contrast, empowers municipalities to address matters that are of a local
nature, see supra text accompanying notes 40, 45, courts are not free to discount local land
use powers when they conflict with a state environmental law. If at all possible, courts are
directed to address interpretive issues in ways that give effect to an entire statute, which
again requires courts to uphold legitimate exercises of land use authority. See § 1922.
317. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1502(a); see Ambrosia v. Yerage, 572 A.2d 777, 779-80 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1990).
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dress local aesthetics, property values, and general welfare can
coexist with one that has a statewide environmental focus. This
approach is conceptually quite different from asking whether a
state environmental regulation with a 100-foot setback conflicts
with a 200-yard setback in a local zoning ordinance. The primary
concern in conflict determinations should be the legislative intent
of the laws that authorize the state regulations and local ordinances, not the intent behind specific provisions drafted pursuant
to those laws.
Even if the conflict is between a state environmental setback
and a more onerous setback imposed in a local regulation, there is
yet another question: Does the mere fact that a local land use ordinance is stricter than a state regulation create conflict? If the
local setback is included in a legitimately enacted land use ordinance, courts will generally uphold the ordinance by distinguish318
ing local land use authority from state environmental objectives.
If, however, local setbacks are included in a police power regulation meant to supplement the SWAIA, courts may instead find conflict with state law. In Liverpool, for example, the court invalidated a more stringent local setback provision once it determined
that it was a geological standard. 319 The court never asked
whether the state regulations established a floor beyond which
local governments could regulate, a possibility raised in the
320
Burkholder dissent.
4.

Negation of Supremacy Analysis

In cases where no preemption exists and courts confront concurrency, disputes are often presented as involving the Commonwealth and a municipality, with the understanding that the
Commonwealth will prevail where conflict exists. 321 In a few
cases, however, courts have presented the parties as equal agents
of the Commonwealth. 322 In these instances, what remains are
conflicting exercises of authority under two different enabling
acts, and supremacy is no longer the issue. Under this analysis, a
municipality might fare better than it would under a traditional
supremacy analysis, where it would have to yield if conflict were
found. If, instead, a municipality's delegated powers under the
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.

See, e.g., SECCRA, 898 A.2d at 683.
Liverpool Twp., 900 A.2d at 1036.
Burkholder, 902 A.2d at 1022 n.8 (Friedman, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., id.
See, e.g., City of Pittsburgh,360 A.2d at 610.
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MPC were to be pitted against the DEP's powers delegated under
an environmental law, the issue could be characterized as one of
pure conflict without supremacy overtones. Statutory interpretation would still be the determining factor, but no one party would
have a superior position. The extent to which the equal-stateagent theme will reappear is uncertain, but local authorities
might turn to such a rationale to even the playing field in these
disputes.
These issues may well be resolved in the years to come. Ideally,
any resolution will preserve the important distinctions between
statewide and local objectives and between environmental and
land use regulation.
B.

Themes, Observations,and State Response

Despite its uncertainties, Pennsylvania preemption and supremacy law offers a number of clear principles and themes. In
addition, the Commonwealth has taken steps to coordinate enviThese
ronmental permitting with local land use provisions.
themes and developments are discussed below.
1.

Case Law Principles

What drives preemption decisions ranges from a desire to maintain the proper constitutional balance between various levels of
324
government 323 to a desire to implement political ideologies.
These objectives are found both in express statements and by
reading between the lines.
Nevertheless, the core themes are quite clear. Case law emphasizes the harshness and rarity of preemption and the absence of
any presumption of preemptive intent. 325 Increasingly, preemption and supremacy issues are resolved solely by statutory inter327
pretation. 326 In addition to finding cases of total preemption,
courts will parse statutes to find instances of limited preemption,
as has been done with the SWMA. 328 Scholars further agree that

323. Spence & Murray, supra note 2, at 1127 (describing preemption as dealing with
conflicts between federal and state power).
324. See id. at 1128-29.
325. See Liverpool Twp., 900 A.2d at 1040.
326. See, e.g., Ogontz, 483 A.2d at 455.
327. See, e.g., Hilovsky, 108 A.2d at 707 (holding total preemption of alcohol regulation).
328. See Township of Plymouth, 531 A.2d at 54 (stating that SWMA preempts local
operational regulations).
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preemption decisions should be guided, at least in part, by a desire
329
to promote stability and certainty.
Additional themes emerge from cases involving state preemption of local environmental or land use legislation. It is these
cases that explore the growing intersection of land use and environmental objectives. Regardless of whether a dispute deals with
a local ordinance providing for companion environmental regulation or one expressly tied to land use, courts have consistently recognized municipalities' authority to deal with local concerns and
the peculiarities of place. 330 Courts have acknowledged that local
environmental regulations better address "unique local characteristics which higher levels of government are often unable to consider because of the need to generalize regulations across greater
geographic areas." 33 1 The same is true for local land use ordinances. Courts have not only recognized the uniquely local focus
of zoning, 332 but have deferred to what they see as the lead role
local governments play in land use matters. 333 The special status
afforded to local land use powers is embodied in statements to the
effect that local land use authority is generally not affected by
state environmental laws. 334 This view has led Pennsylvania
courts to protect local land use ordinances against preemption
3 35
challenges under the SWMA.
2.

Other Themes and Considerations

Two final considerations are raised here, one dealing with preemption, one with supremacy. It is clear that, at least to some
degree, preemption law reflects political realities. A decade ago,
Professor David Spence and Professor Paula Murray conducted an
empirical study to determine what drove judicial thinking in federal preemption decisions. 336 They were curious about a possible
link between the large number of Republican judges on the federal
329. See Thomas R. Head, III, Local Regulation of Animal Feeding Operations:Concerns,
Limits, and Options for Southeastern States, 6 ENVTL. LAW. 503, 574 (Feb. 2000); Buzbee,
supra note 17, at 1590.
330. See, e.g., Abbey, 559 A.2d at 111; see also SECCRA, 898 A.2d at 683 (upholding
zoning ordinance based on township authority to address the general welfare of the community).
331. See Yanggen & Amrhein, supranote 15, at 7.
332. See Greene Twp., 379 A.2d at 1385.
333. See, e.g., Benham, 523 A.2d at 315 (giving zoning ordinances "great play"); see also
Yanggen & Amrhein, supra note 15, at 43.
334. Yanggen & Amrhein, supra note 15, at 47, 49-50; Buzbee, supra note 17, at 1568.
335. See SECCRA, 898 A.2d at 683.
336. Spence & Murray, supra note 2.
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bench and the strong number of cases that preempted state and
local laws. 337 Their findings suggested that, regardless of political
affiliation, judges chose to preempt more often than not, 338 opting
for a Coasean outcome of less regulation that favors private solutions. 339 They also found that the characteristics of a case and
personal ideology influenced outcomes, 340 and that judges typically
deferred to agencies in cases where agencies took a position on
preemption. 34 1 In conclusion, judicial ideologies were clearly at
342
work in preemption cases.
There is another political motivation in preemption cases that
perhaps contributes to the large number of pro-preemption cases.
A local authority might challenge the legislation of higher levels of
343
government to score political points, even when its case is weak.
Politically driven litigation strategies and case outcomes fashioned
by judicial ideology are realities to consider when determining
how, if at all, preemption rules might be modified.
A final consideration addresses supremacy, not preemption, and
it relates to legislators, not judges. Legislatures may fail to address preemption and concurrency altogether, 344 but other times
may expressly indicate their intent. 345 In cases where a legislature intends to allow concurrent local regulation, it may fail to
clarify the level of local authority that is authorized. One possibility is to allow local regulation in the same area that is no more
stringent than the state standards. In such a case, the state law
346
creates a ceiling above which municipalities may not regulate.
337. See id. at 1165-67.
338. Id.
339. Id. A Coasean perspective, named after economist Ronald Coase, reflects his influential work, which theorized that private actors can address certain environmental problems more efficiently than the government. A contrasting view is attributed to economist
A.C. Pigou, who argued that governmental response was necessary to address the social
costs associated with environmental harms. Id. at 1154-55.
340. Id. at 1194.
341. Spence & Murray, supra note 2 at 1194 (also noting judges pay less deference to the
enacting Congress as time passes by).
342. Id. at 1130, 1162. Rather than focusing on decisional rules, they sought to explain
preemption case outcomes based on numerous variables, including "principles of federalism ....

statutory interpretation problems,...

political pressures, and ...

judges' political

or policy preferences and attitudes toward regulation." Id. at 1162.
343. Id. at 1160-61.
344. For example, the General Assembly did not expressly deal with preemption in the
SWMA. See Sunny Farms, 474 A.2d at 59 (noting that the SWMA's certificate of need
provision is the only exception).
345. Warner Co., 612 A.2d at 580-81; see also Buzbee, supra note 17, at 1555 (noting that
little attention has been given to the issue).
346. See Buzbee, supra note 17, at 1552. Professor Buzbee's article addresses federal
preemption of state and local legislation, but its arguments are no less relevant to state and
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The alternative is concurrent regulation where state law serves as
347
a floor that allows local regulation as long it is no less stringent.
When legislatures fail to indicate which type of concurrency is authorized, courts must make the determination by applying principles of conflict, often with inconsistent results. 348 Indeed, the different outcomes in Sunny Farms and Liverpool Township would
likely have been avoided had the General Assembly clarified the
extent of concurrent municipal authority in the SWIA.
Professor William Buzbee, who has addressed this issue in
depth in relation to federal and state concurrency, points out that
legislatures should consider whether floor or ceiling regulation
schemes best suit the objectives of the law. Environmental regimes often create concurrent, multilayered institutional structures that tap the expertise of various levels of government and
diverse decision makers. 349 Because multiple governmental institutions are generally involved in these programs, legislatures
should consider to what extent local action should be restricted, if
at all.
There are reasons to embrace and reject both models. Statewide
standards beyond which local regulation may not venture are effi350
cient because they ensure stability and reduce litigation costs.
Not only does the marketplace benefit, but so too do agencies and
legislators (who might stand to gain politically). 351 The benefits of
local legislative conflicts. He refers to federal laws that allow state and local concurrency
within federal limits as "ceiling preemption" and "unitary federal choice preemption" interchangeably, see id. at 1554-55, when those laws do not preempt state and local law at all.
Nevertheless, his arguments may be aptly applied to supremacy issues.
347. See id. at 1551-52 (referring to regulatory floors as "one-way ratchets" that allow
more stringent regulation).
348. See Head, supra note 325, at 547-49 (describing two Minnesota cases dealing with
state laws that regulated animal feedlot operations, one holding that more restrictive township setbacks conflicted with state law because they would prohibit the construction of the
plaintiffs facility, Bd. of Supervisors v. ValAdCo, 504 N.W.2d 267, 269-70 (Minn. Ct. App.
1993), and the other upholding a county setback provision because it did not prohibit what
the state law authorized and thus there was no conflict, Blue Earth County Pork Prod., Inc.
v. County of Blue Earth, 558 N.W.2d 25, 26, 28-30 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997)).
349. See Buzbee, supra note 17, at 1565 (describing state involvement in federal environmental laws such as the Clean Water Act under the principle of "cooperative federalism").
350. See id. at 1590. Again, although Professor Buzbee's arguments were made in reference to conflicts between federal and state and/or local regulation, they are also applicable
to state and local regulatory conflicts.
351. Buzbee explained: "If Congress or an agency becomes the only game in town, it will
attract greater attention from affected industry as well as other supporting or opposed
stakeholders. Legislators may benefit from electoral or monetary support. Agencies may
be able to secure expanded budgets or even engage in outright favoritism to affected industry in exchange for the usual rewards of regulatory capture .
Id. at 1590 (footnotes
omitted).
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setting state standards as a floor are equally compelling; they create opportunities for positive interaction among multiple actors,
broad-based participation, and a level of accountability that may
force program modification when the state, left to its own devices,
might choose to maintain the status quo. 352 State standards that
set maximum ceilings ignore the opportunities that multilayered
environmental schemes create and may perpetuate regulatory
stasis on the part of state actors. 353 Regulatory floors, on the other
hand, visit hardship on industry by imposing multiple local standards that threaten market certainty and place authority in the
hands of provincial decision makers who might lack resources or
354
expertise.
Professor Buzbee offers a detailed decision-making framework
to assist legislatures in determining whether a law should set a
regulatory ceiling or floor. Among its factors are institutional capabilities, the nature of the regulatory challenge, the regulatory
target, "issues of scale," data needs, and the nature of the risk the
law targets. 355 Together, these considerations can lead to betterinformed concurrency decisions.
3.

DEPResponse to MPC Amendments of 2000

Recently, the DEP has taken steps to deal with environmentalland use conflicts. The MPC, which applies to all Pennsylvanian
municipalities but Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and Philadelphia
County, 35 6 was amended in 2000 in an attempt to coordinate state
agency actions with local land use planning. Section 10619.2 of
the MPC provides:
When a county adopts a comprehensive plan . . . and any municipalities therein have adopted comprehensive plans and zoning
ordinances . . ., Commonwealth agencies shall consider and may
rely upon comprehensive plans and zoning ordinances when reviewing applications for the funding or permitting of infrastruc357
ture or facilities.

352. See id. at 1588-89.
353. See id. at 1584-85.
354. See id. at 1582-83, 1600.
355. Buzbee, supranote 17, at 1601-03.
356. See supra note 41; see also Final Revision of Policy for Considerationof Local Comprehensive Plans and Zoning Ordinancesin DEPReview of Permits for Facilitiesand Infrastructure, Document Number 012-0200-001 (DEP Policy Office March 6, 2004) available at
www.dep.state.pa.us [hereinafter DEP Land Use Policy].
357. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10619.2 (2008).
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In 2004, the DEP issued its Final Revision of Policy for Consideration of Local Comprehensive Plans and Zoning Ordinance in
DEP Review of Permits for Facilities and Infrastructure, which
implemented section 10619.2.358 The Policy instituted a land use
review process for specified permit authorizations and requires
permit applicants to answer a number of land use questions in a
General Information Form (GIF) that all applicants are required
to complete as part of the permitting process. 3 59 The Policy also
gives municipalities the opportunity to comment on applicant re360
sponses to the questions.
The process is subject to a number of limitations. It only applies
if the facility that is the subject of the application satisfies at least
one of three conditions: 1) it is in a county with a comprehensive
plan, and the municipality has a comprehensive plan or is part of
a multi-municipal comprehensive plan, and the municipality has
enacted zoning ordinances, and the ordinances and comprehensive
plan are consistent with the MPC; 2) the municipality has a joint
zoning ordinance; or 3) the municipality has adopted zoning ordinances as part of a cooperative agreement. 36 1 Furthermore, the
review process only applies to permit authorizations for facilities
enumerated in the Policy's Appendix A, which, among others, in362
cludes facilities under the air quality and solid waste programs.
If these conditions are satisfied, the applicant must respond to a
series of questions that ask whether the proposed facility will be
consistent with the comprehensive plan, whether the applicant
will have to obtain zoning approval, and whether any relevant
zoning ordinances are the subject of litigation. 363 Applicants are
encouraged to provide the DEP with copies of zoning or other land
use approvals. 364 Municipalities may comment on proposed projects, and the DEP will attempt to contact them to discuss relevant planning and zoning matters. 365 The DEP will rely on infor-

358. DEP Land Use Policy, supra note 352.
359. Id. at 3.
360. Id.
361. Id. at ii.
362. Id. at Appendix A. Notably, the land use review process applies to facilities managing hazardous, municipal, and residual waste. Id.
363. DEP Land Use Policy, supranote 352, at 3-4.
364. Id. at 4. Applicants can opt out of the process by submitting land use approval
letters from the municipality with the GIF form. Id. at 7.
365. Id. at 5.
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mation it obtains from municipalities to determine whether there
366
is a conflict with local planning or zoning.
The goal of the land use review process is "to avoid or minimize
conflicts between department permit decisions and local land use
decisions." 367 Importantly, the Policy specifically recognizes the
difference between regulating certain facilities "as particular regulated activities" and local land use regulation, and the Policy further states that "[1local municipalities can establish valid zoning
requirements that can be imposed on these activities where state
law preempts local regulation of these activities."368 With this distinction in mind,the Policy imposes a mandatory duty on the DEP
to consider comprehensive plans and zoning as part of the permit369
ting process.
In cases of conflict, permit reviewers must notify the DEP Policy
Office, which has numerous response options, including recommending the suspension of the permit review process until the
conflict is resolved, and providing guidance to the permit review
staff as to whether the permit "should be approved, approved with
a condition, or denied."3 7 0 The DEP has read the MPC provision to
give it discretion in terms of how it chooses to rely on local plan371
ning and zoning.
These new procedures have the potential to avoid the type of
disputes that have led to litigation in the past. But they are not a
panacea. First, the Policy has no effect on preemption; only the
General Assembly and the courts may determine whether state
law forecloses all local authority in an area. Furthermore, although the Policy addresses supremacy and conflict, it only
reaches conflicts between state environmental programs and land
use ordinances. It does not address conflicts between state environmental programs and local supplemental environmental legislation, such as the dispute in Sunny Farms. Finally, even if a
permit conflicts with a local land use ordinance, the Policy only
366. Id. at 5-6. In Berks County v. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., the Commonwealth Court held
that the DEP fulfilled its obligations under the MPC by relying on the municipality's silence and the permittee's response on the land use questionnaire to the effect that a zoning
conflict had been resolved. 894 A.2d 183, 195 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006), appeal denied, 904
A.2d 1104 (Pa. 2006). The court further held that the MPC provision did not require the
DEP to engage in its own legal review of a related settlement agreement between the permittee and municipality. Id.
367. DEP Land Use Policy, supra note 352, at 7-8.
368. Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
369. Id. at 7-8.
370. Id. at 8.
371. Id. at 9.
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applies if the facility falls into one of the three geographic categories and if the permit sought is listed in Appendix A.
The DEP's experience with the Policy has been positive-but
limited. The process has worked well when a municipality has a
zoning ordinance and is aware of the process. 72 When the Policy
Office has chosen to insert permit conditions in cases of conflict, it
has been able to clarify that the permit is conditioned on compliance with local land use restrictions. 373 Still, as of the writing of
this article, the Policy Office has yet to deal with a conflict be374
tween SWIA setbacks and local zoning ordinance setbacks.
Additionally, it is believed that the DEP needs to engage in more
outreach to inform municipalities about their right to participate
in the land use review process. 375 Nevertheless, the Policy takes a
significant and positive step toward addressing the convergence of
land use and environmental objectives. It acknowledges that DEP
permit decisions implicate land use concerns and forces the DEP
to directly address conflicts while preserving the independence of
local authority. The Policy's statement that local land use authority is viable even when local environmental regulation is preempted strongly suggests that the DEP will recognize a municipality's right to impose zoning restrictions, such as setbacks, that are
more stringent than the Department's operational regulations.
V.

SUGGESTIONS AND NEW DIRECTIONS

The foregoing discussion of cases, themes, and observations
suggests ways in which Pennsylvania's preemption and supremacy doctrines might be modified to ensure that they address the
growing intersection of environmental regulation and land use
planning. The following remarks address many levels of governance because all of them have a significant stake in ensuring legal
sustainability into the future.
First, the General Assembly must consistently recognize its
power over preemption and supremacy and rationally consider
legislative alternatives and their consequences. It should also
carefully look for regulatory overlap in what might seem to be
372. Telephone Interview with Denise M. Brinley, Executive Assistant, DEP Office of
Community Revitalization and Local Government Support (June 27, 2008). Ms, Brinley,
who handles the Policy Office review of potential conflicts, reported that she reviews one or
two permit applications per month. Id.
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Id.
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separate legal areas. Nowhere is this cautious approach more important than in areas where a law implicates local land use authority. The initial legislative choice is between preemption and
concurrency, with the understanding that, for any given environmental law, a mixed preemption/concurrency regime is also possible. Additionally, the legislature must consider preemption of two
types of municipal authority: local land use authority and local
police power to address nuisances and environmental matters. In
both cases, laws should be specific about the degree to which municipal authority is foreclosed or retained. 376 As an alternative,
the General Assembly can direct the DEP, with proper guidelines,
to clarify the extent of local authority in its rulemaking, or expand
MPC provisions to augment state agency review of local land use
377
regulations.
In cases where the legislature authorizes local concurrent environmental authority, it should decide whether state standards
establish a regulatory ceiling or floor, weighing the advantages
and disadvantages of each option. 378 If a law is not meant to have
any impact on local land use authority, it should explicitly say so.
In all cases, drafting should proceed with care to ensure that
terms such as "preempt," "supersede," and other relevant statutory phrases are clear and accurate.
Like the General Assembly, the EQB and DEP should clarify to
what extent local authority can coexist with their regulatory programs. Furthermore, the DEP should continue to vigorously implement its Land Use Policy as it says it will: with an eye toward
preserving local land use authority within the permitting process.
This effort should include greater outreach to municipalities in
cases where the land use review process is triggered.
Courts also need to adjust their approach by consistently employing an analytical framework that distinguishes between preemption and conflict. Because of their co-mingling of those concepts, the Duff questions should be disassembled and repackaged
within a multistep analysis that first determines the scope of the
municipal authority at issue and whether the exercise of that au376. See Yanggen & Amrhein, supra note 15, at 94.
377. Id.
378. See supra text accompanying notes 344-49. In Pennsylvania, there may be less
leeway than in other states. Executive Order 1996-1, issued during the Ridge administration, mandates that where a federal regulation exists, Pennsylvania's regulations shall not
exceed the federal standard unless justified by a "compelling and articulable Pennsylvania
interest or required by state law." Thomas J. Ridge, Governor, Exec. Order No. 1996-1,
Regulatory Review and Promulgation 1(e) (Pa. Feb. 6, 1996).
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thority is ultra vires or unreasonable. If the ordinance fails for
one of these reasons, the analysis ends. If it proceeds, courts
should then confront the preemption question narrowly, asking
whether a state environmental law forecloses the specific municipal power that has been exercised. If the state law does not expressly preempt the municipality's action, the court should consider the possibility of field preemption by considering legislative
intent. Finally, if there is no express or implied preemption, then
the court must consider whether there is a conflict between the
state law and local ordinance. Ogontz dictates that the essence of
this analysis is statutory interpretation,379 where the statute's objectives are paramount. The distinction between the communityfocused objectives of local environmental and land use legislation,
and the statewide health and environmental objectives of state
environmental laws, should serve as the prism through which
courts consider legislative intent.
In this regard, a conflict analysis that asks whether local law allows something prohibited by state law or prohibits something
state law allows (a common inquiry that is included in Duff s five
questions) 38 0 may prove to be overbroad. This is especially likely
to occur when the competing powers are themselves distinct. For
example, that question would certainly be answered in the affirmative if a local land use or nuisance setback is larger than one
included in a DEP solid waste rule. Because an affirmative answer to any one of Duff s questions establishes conflict, 38 ' the state
regulation would prevail. However, the allow/prohibit question
totally ignores the difference between state environmental authority and local police power and land use authority. Local regulations that allow something prohibited by state law may well establish conflict, but courts should reject the second part of the allow/prohibit question that asks if local law prohibits what state
law allows. Instead, courts should determine conflict by looking
solely to statutory construction, by examining the consequences of
allowing a local ordinance to coexist with state law. 38 2 A carefully
crafted approach to preemption and conflict will foster consistency

379. Ogontz, 483 A.2d at 454-55.
380. Duff, 532 A.2d at 505 (asking, in ascertaining conflict, "whether the ordinance forbid[s] what the legislature has permitted .
.
381. Liverpool Twp., 900 A.2d at 1033.
382. See Ogontz, 483 A.2d at 455.
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and may help reduce the influence of judicial political ideologies in
38 3
matters of preemption.
Municipalities should also take steps to integrate land use and
environmental regulation in ways that are more efficient and less
likely to spur litigation. First, the means used to address the impacts of environmentally offensive facilities matters. Zoning is
the best option because it can be used to preserve property values
and to promote the general welfare via aesthetic and even environmental regulation.83 4 Furthermore, the special play and deference given to zoning regulations, as well as the judicial understanding of its unique objectives, arguably give zoning ordinances
an advantage over police power ordinances in preemption and conflict disputes. Local authorities that instead choose to address
environmentally offensive facilities by police power regulation
should proceed only if they believe that the field is not preempted
and that an ordinance is needed to protect specific local- not
statewide-environmental well-being. Those municipalities that
fall within the DEP Land Use Policy should take advantage of
that program by encouraging zoning permit applicants to seek
letters of approval for early opt-out status and by promptly responding to DEP inquiries about potential conflict. Both the DEP
and local authorities should encourage facility owners to deal with
local regulations first, whether they are found in police power or
land use ordinances. Municipalities are free to condition land use
permits on DEP approval, 38 5 and early municipal approval can
streamline land use review by the DEP.
CONCLUSION

Virtually every environmental decision, whether made by the
state or a municipality, has an impact on land use; the reverse is
true as well. This reality becomes more apparent with every passing year, and it is certainly evident in the case law reviewed in
this article. The benefits of this interest convergence are significant. There is now more holistic planning by the DEP by virtue of
its Land Use Policy and a broadened vision on the part of municipalities pursuant to statutes such as the SWMA, which engage
383. See text accompanying notes 330-36.
384. See 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10603(a), (b); Sunny Farms, 474 A.2d at 60 (likening
the police power ordinance at issue to zoning ordinances that protect the "public health,
property values and aesthetics").
385. See Bloom v. Lower Paxton Twp., 457 A.2d 166, 169 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983); Stein
v. Easttown Twp. Bd. of Super's, 532 A.2d 906, 912 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987).
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them in important environmental undertakings. These developments will effect very real progress toward the type of integrated
planning demanded of sustainability. There are obstacles, however, including local regulatory initiatives that run afoul of state
authority under preemption or supremacy principles, and state
regulatory authority that is interpreted in ways that thwart legitimate police power and land use regulation by municipalities.
Pennsylvania law has done well addressing the former threat, but
has not been consistent in addressing the latter. It is hoped that
the discussion and suggestions included in these pages will bring
attention to these issues and lead to a more principled preemption
and supremacy framework in Pennsylvania, one that will well
serve the public health and environment of the Commonwealth as
a whole and the welfare and concerns of its many diverse communities.

